CVE-2026-61430: PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypass in `web_crawl` SSRF protection allows internal response disclosure

PraisonAI’s web_crawl agent tool performs a server-side HTTP fetch of an agent/attacker-influenced URL. SSRF is meant to be prevented by _is_safe_crawl_url(), which resolves the hostname and rejects private/loopback/link-local IPs at validation time. The validated value is the URL string (not a pinned IP); the fetch backend then re-resolves the hostname at connection time. Because validation and connection perform two independent DNS resolutions, a DNS-rebinding domain that returns a public IP during validation and an internal IP during the fetch fully bypasses the guard, and the internal HTTP response body is returned to the caller.

This is SSRF with internal response disclosure (read-back) — not blind SSRF. Runtime-confirmed against PraisonAI 4.6.63; the crawl response returned the controlled internal markers PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 / FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91. Severity High. Reachable by any actor who can influence the URL an agent crawls (e.g. a chat/bot/agent surface).