CVE-2026-78681: NLTK: Entity-expansion DoS (billion laughs) via remaining raw ElementTree parses

Several XML parsing sites in NLTK still used xml.etree.ElementTree directly, which honours <!ENTITY> declarations in a document’s internal DTD subset. A crafted document a few hundred bytes long can expand to megabytes in memory (each nesting level multiplies by ten), a denial-of-service.

Affected call sites (<= 3.10.2):

• nltk.chunk.named_entity.load_ace_file — parses ACE annotation XML
• nltk.internals.ElementWrapper — converts any given string to an Element
• nltk.downloader — Package.fromxml, Collection.fromxml, _find_collections, _find_packages

libexpat 2.6.0 added an input-amplification cap, but it only engages above an activation threshold (~8 MiB output) and depends on whichever libexpat the interpreter links; builds against older libexpat have no cap at all. External entities are not resolved by ElementTree, so this is a memory-amplification DoS (CWE-776), not XXE/file disclosure.

This completes the earlier defusedxml adoption that these sites were missed by. Fix routes all of them through a new nltk.xmlsec module that refuses entity declarations, preferring defusedxml and falling back to a standard-library xml.parsers.expat pre-scan when defusedxml is absent.