On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants. The list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked an f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the /v1/quarantine list and admit/reject endpoints.
On a multi-tenant stigmem node, RTBF (right-to-be-forgotten) tombstones were mis-scoped two ways. (1) issue_tombstone defaulted the tenant to "default" instead of the caller's tenant, so tombstones could be written to the wrong tenant. (2) The read-suppression path — _get_tombstone_filter (routes/facts/common.py) and the _tombstone_scope_cache (lifecycle/tombstones.py) — had no tenant_id predicate, so tombstone suppression was applied tenant-blind across fact queries and provenance. Reached via /v1/tombstones and the fact query/provenance read paths.
On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a caller holding a write credential for one tenant can run a decay sweep that acts on every tenant's facts. The candidate-selection queries in lifecycle/decay.py (_select_ttl_candidates, _select_confidence_candidates) carried no tenant_id predicate, and the caller's tenant was not threaded into the sweep or its async worker (run_decay_sweep / _decay_job_worker), reached via POST /v1/decay/sweep.
A single configuration flag could disable plugin signature enforcement. If an operator unintentionally carried that setting into an environment where plugin paths are writable by less-trusted users, unsigned plugin code could be loaded.
Postgres backend schema identifiers were interpolated into SQL strings. In the reviewed code path the schema value is operator-controlled, but the pattern was unsafe if future call sites allowed tenant or request-controlled schema names. Impacted users are operators using the Postgres backend in affected versions.
A mismatch in federation peer-token timestamp handling could cause valid peer tokens to be treated as expired. Impacted deployments are Stigmem nodes using federation peer authentication paths from affected versions. The primary impact is availability and reliability of authenticated federation flows.
Federation peer registration accepted peer key material during registration without a separate administrator approval step based on an out-of-band fingerprint check. Impacted deployments are nodes that accept federation peer registration across a network where initial registration could be intercepted or misdirected.
Stigmem nodes with federation enabled could be configured to run without mTLS outside loopback-only local development. In affected deployments, federation traffic may traverse the network without the intended transport protection. Impacted users are operators who enabled federation and explicitly disabled mTLS while binding the node to a non-loopback URL.
Stigmem nodes configured with authentication disabled could grant the anonymous identity broad read/write/federation capabilities if exposed outside a loopback-only local development environment. Impacted users are operators who intentionally disabled authentication while binding the node to a non-loopback URL.