Advisories for Pypi/Psd-Tools package

In psd-tools (all releases exposing the SmartObject API through v1.17.0), SmartObject.save() writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted .psd can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or ../-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in SmartObject.open() for external-kind smart objects …

A security review of the psd_tools.compression module (conducted against the fix/invalid-rle-compression branch, commits 7490ffa–2a006f5) identified the following pre-existing issues. The two findings introduced and fixed by those commits (Cython buffer overflow, IndexError on lone repeat header) are excluded from this report.

An issue was discovered in psd-tools before 1.9.4. The Cython implementation of RLE decoding did not check for malformed PSD input data during decoding to the PIL.Image or NumPy format, leading to a Buffer Overflow.