nbconvert allows arbitrary file writes to locations outside the intended output directory when processing notebooks containing crafted cell attachment filenames. The ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor passes attachment filenames directly to the filesystem without sanitization, enabling path traversal attacks. This vulnerability provides complete control over both the destination path and file extension.
When HTMLExporter.embed_images=True, nbconvert's markdown renderer allows arbitrary file read via path traversal in image references. A malicious notebook can exfiltrate sensitive files from the conversion host by embedding them as base64 data URIs in the output HTML.
On Windows, converting a notebook containing SVG output to a PDF results in unauthorized code execution. Specifically, a third party can create a inkscape.bat file that defines a Windows batch script, capable of arbitrary code execution. When a user runs jupyter nbconvert –to pdf on a notebook containing SVG output to a PDF on a Windows platform from this directory, the inkscape.bat file is run unexpectedly.
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') in nbconvert.