Advisories for Pypi/Monai package

A Path Traversal (Zip Slip) vulnerability exists in MONAI's _download_from_ngc_private() function. The function uses zipfile.ZipFile.extractall() without path validation, while other similar download functions in the same codebase properly use the existing safe_extract_member() function. This appears to be an implementation oversight, as safe extraction is already implemented and used elsewhere in MONAI. CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)

The pickle_operations function in monai/data/utils.py automatically handles dictionary key-value pairs ending with a specific suffix and deserializes them using pickle.loads() . This function also lacks any security measures. When verified using the following proof-of-concept, arbitrary code execution can occur.

In model_dict = torch.load(full_path, map_location=torch.device(device), weights_only=True) in monai/bundle/scripts.py , weights_only=True is loaded securely. However, insecure loading methods still exist elsewhere in the project, such as when loading checkpoints. This is a common practice when users want to reduce training time and costs by loading pre-trained models downloaded from platforms like huggingface. Loading a checkpoint containing malicious content can trigger a deserialization vulnerability, leading to code execution. The following proof-of-concept demonstrates …

The extractall function zip_file.extractall(output_dir) is used directly to process compressed files. It is used in many places in the project. When the Zip file containing malicious content is decompressed, it will overwrite the system files. In addition, the project allows the download of the zip content through the link, which increases the scope of exploitation of this vulnerability. When reproducing locally, follow the process below to create a malicious zip …