Advisories for Pypi/Litellm package

Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process. The …

The POST /prompts/test endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow …

The POST /prompts/test endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow …

A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, …

Three issues combine into a full authentication bypass chain: Weak hashing: User passwords are stored as unsalted SHA-256 hashes, making them vulnerable to rainbow table attacks and trivially identifying users with identical passwords. Hash exposure: Multiple API endpoints (/user/info, /user/update, /spend/users) return the password hash field in responses to any authenticated user regardless of role. Plaintext passwords could also potentially be exposed in certain scenarios. Pass-the-hash: The /v2/login endpoint accepts …

The /config/update endpoint does not enforce admin role authorization. A user who is already authenticated into the platform can then use this endpoint to do the following: Modify proxy configuration and environment variables Register custom pass-through endpoint handlers pointing to attacker-controlled Python code, achieving remote code execution Read arbitrary server files by setting UI_LOGO_PATH and fetching via /get_image Take over other priveleged accounts by overwriting UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD environment variables

When JWT authentication is enabled (enable_jwt_auth: true), the OIDC userinfo cache uses token[:20] as the cache key. JWT headers produced by the same signing algorithm generate identical first 20 characters. This configuration option is not enabled by default. Most instances are not affected. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a token whose first 20 characters match a legitimate user's cached token. On cache hit, the attacker inherits the legitimate user's identity …

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.

BerriAI/litellm version 1.40.12 contains a vulnerability that allows remote code execution. The issue exists in the handling of the 'post_call_rules' configuration, where a callback function can be added. The provided value is split at the final '.' mark, with the last part considered the function name and the remaining part appended with the '.py' extension and imported. This allows an attacker to set a system method, such as 'os.system', as …

A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in berriai/litellm version v1.44.5. This vulnerability can be exploited by appending characters, such as dashes (-), to the end of a multipart boundary in an HTTP request. The server continuously processes each character, leading to excessive resource consumption and rendering the service unavailable. The issue is unauthenticated and does not require any user interaction, impacting all users of the service.

A vulnerability in BerriAI/litellm, as of commit 26c03c9, allows unauthenticated users to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by exploiting the use of ast.literal_eval to parse user input. This function is not safe and is prone to DoS attacks, which can crash the litellm Python server.

In berriai/litellm before version 1.44.12, the litellm/litellm_core_utils/litellm_logging.py file contains a vulnerability where the API key masking code only masks the first 5 characters of the key. This results in the leakage of almost the entire API key in the logs, exposing a significant amount of the secret key. The issue affects version v1.44.9.

An improper authorization vulnerability exists in the main-latest version of BerriAI/litellm. When a user with the role 'internal_user_viewer' logs into the application, they are provided with an overly privileged API key. This key can be used to access all the admin functionality of the application, including endpoints such as '/users/list' and '/users/get_users'. This vulnerability allows for privilege escalation within the application, enabling any account to become a PROXY ADMIN.

In berriai/litellm version v1.52.1, an issue in proxy_server.py causes the leakage of Langfuse API keys when an error occurs while parsing team settings. This vulnerability exposes sensitive information, including langfuse_secret and langfuse_public_key, which can provide full access to the Langfuse project storing all requests.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in berriai/litellm version 1.38.10. This vulnerability allows users to specify the api_base parameter when making requests to POST /chat/completions, causing the application to send the request to the domain specified by api_base. This request includes the OpenAI API key. A malicious user can set the api_base to their own domain and intercept the OpenAI API key, leading to unauthorized access and potential misuse …

BerriAI/litellm version v1.35.8 contains a vulnerability where an attacker can achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability exists in the add_deployment function, which decodes and decrypts environment variables from base64 and assigns them to os.environ. An attacker can exploit this by sending a malicious payload to the /config/update endpoint, which is then processed and executed by the server when the get_secret function is triggered. This requires the server to use Google …

berriai/litellm version 1.34.34 is vulnerable to improper access control in its team management functionality. This vulnerability allows attackers to perform unauthorized actions such as creating, updating, viewing, deleting, blocking, and unblocking any teams, as well as adding or deleting any member to or from any teams. The vulnerability stems from insufficient access control checks in various team management endpoints, enabling attackers to exploit these functionalities without proper authorization.

An SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the berriai/litellm repository, specifically within the /global/spend/logs endpoint. The vulnerability arises due to improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command. The affected code constructs an SQL query by concatenating an unvalidated api_key parameter directly into the query, making it susceptible to SQL Injection if the api_key contains malicious data. This issue affects the latest version of the repository. Successful exploitation of …

A blind SQL injection vulnerability exists in the berriai/litellm application, specifically within the '/team/update' process. The vulnerability arises due to the improper handling of the 'user_id' parameter in the raw SQL query used for deleting users. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious SQL commands through the 'user_id' parameter, leading to potential unauthorized access to sensitive information such as API keys, user information, and tokens stored in the …

BerriAI's litellm, in its latest version, is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to improper input validation on the /audio/transcriptions endpoint. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request that includes a file path to the server, which then deletes the specified file without proper authorization or validation. This vulnerability is present in the code where os.remove(file.filename) is used to delete a file, allowing any user …

A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in the berriai/litellm project due to improper control of the generation of code when using the eval function unsafely in the litellm.get_secret() method. Specifically, when the server utilizes Google KMS, untrusted data is passed to the eval function without any sanitization. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious values into environment variables through the /config/update endpoint, which allows for the update of …

BerriAI/litellm is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) via the /completions endpoint. The vulnerability arises from the hf_chat_template method processing the chat_template parameter from the tokenizer_config.json file through the Jinja template engine without proper sanitization. Attackers can exploit this by crafting malicious tokenizer_config.json files that execute arbitrary code on the server.