GuardDog's safe_extract() function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data.
A path traversal vulnerability exists in GuardDog's safe_extract() function that allows malicious PyPI packages to write arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Remote Code Execution on systems running GuardDog. CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
Unsafe extracting using shutil.unpack_archive() from a remotely retrieved tarball may lead to writing the extracted file to an unintended destination.
This advisory duplicates another.
Running GuardDog against a specially-crafted package can allow an attacker to write an arbitrary file on the machine where GuardDog is executed. This is due to a path traversal vulnerability when extracting the .tar.gz file of the package being scanned, which exists by design in the tarfile.TarFile.extractall function. See also https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile.TarFile.extractall
This advisory duplicates another.