The vulnerability is a silent RCE - it allows arbitrary code to be loaded through the custom_pipeline flow from a Hub repo, with no custom_pipeline or trust_remote_code kwargs and nothing suspicious in the config. The from_pretrained call succeeds and returns a functional pipeline.
The vulnerability is a silent RCE - it allows arbitrary code to be loaded through the custom_pipeline flow from a Hub repo, with no custom_pipeline or trust_remote_code kwargs and nothing suspicious in the config. The from_pretrained call succeeds and returns a functional pipeline.
A trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check: Cross-repo custom_pipeline. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('repoA', custom_pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust_remote_code=False) — the …