BentoML envs[].name Dockerfile command injection — sibling of CVE-2026-33744 / CVE-2026-35043 A malicious bentofile.yaml containing a newline-injected value in envs[].name produces unquoted RUN directives in the BentoML-generated Dockerfile. When the victim runs bentoml containerize on the imported bento, those RUN directives execute on the host during docker build. Verified end-to-end on bentoml==1.4.38. Vulnerable code src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_v2.j2:71-73: {% for env in bento_envs %} {% set stage = env.stage | default("all") -%} {% …
The same Dockerfile template that mishandles envs[*].name (pending GHSA-w2pm-x38x-jp44) also interpolates docker.base_image raw with no escaping, newline filtering, or validation. A malicious bento.yaml with a multi-line docker.base_image value smuggles arbitrary Dockerfile directives into the generated Dockerfile, and bentoml containerize then runs docker build which executes the injected RUN directives on the victim host.
BentoML's bentoml build packaging workflow follows attacker-controlled symlinks inside the build context and copies the referenced file contents into the generated Bento artifact. If a victim builds an untrusted repository or other attacker-supplied build context, the attacker can place a symlink such as loot.txt -> /tmp/outside-marker.txt or a link to a more sensitive local file. When bentoml build runs, BentoML dereferences the symlink and packages the target file contents into …
The Dockerfile generation function generate_containerfile() in src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py uses an unsandboxed jinja2.Environment with the jinja2.ext.do extension to render user-provided dockerfile_template files. When a victim imports a malicious bento archive and runs bentoml containerize, attacker-controlled Jinja2 template code executes arbitrary Python directly on the host machine, bypassing all container isolation.
Commit ce53491 (March 24) fixed command injection via system_packages in Dockerfile templates and images.py by adding shlex.quote. However, the cloud deployment path in src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py was not included in the fix. Line 1648 interpolates system_packages directly into a shell command using an f-string without any quoting. The generated script is uploaded to BentoCloud as setup.sh and executed on the cloud build infrastructure during deployment, making this a remote code execution on …
The docker.system_packages field in bentofile.yaml accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile RUN commands without sanitization. Since system_packages is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious bentofile.yaml achieves arbitrary command execution during bentoml containerize / docker build.
The safe_extract_tarfile() function validates that each tar member's path is within the destination directory, but for symlink members it only validates the symlink's own path, not the symlink's target. An attacker can create a malicious bento/model tar file containing a symlink pointing outside the extraction directory, followed by a regular file that writes through the symlink, achieving arbitrary file write on the host filesystem.
BentoML's bentofile.yaml configuration allows path traversal attacks through multiple file path fields (description, docker.setup_script, docker.dockerfile_template, conda.environment_yml). An attacker can craft a malicious bentofile that, when built by a victim, exfiltrates arbitrary files from the filesystem into the bento archive. This enables supply chain attacks where sensitive files (SSH keys, credentials, environment variables) are silently embedded in bentos and exposed when pushed to registries or deployed.