The TIM (PSX TIM) image parser in ImageMagick contains a critical integer overflow vulnerability in the ReadTIMImage function (coders/tim.c). The code reads width and height (16-bit values) from the file header and calculates image_size = 2 * width * height without checking for overflow. On 32-bit systems (or where size_t is 32-bit), this calculation can overflow if width and height are large (e.g., 65535), wrapping around to a small value. …
Withdrawn Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it does not affect the ImageMagick project's NuGet packages. Original Description We believe that we have discovered a potential security vulnerability in ImageMagick’s Magick++ layer that manifests when Options::fontFamily is invoked with an empty string. Vulnerability Details Clearing a font family calls RelinquishMagickMemory on _drawInfo->font, freeing the font string but leaving _drawInfo->font pointing to freed memory while _drawInfo->family is set to that …
CVE-2025-57803 claims to be patched in ImageMagick 7.1.2-2, but the fix is incomplete and ineffective. The latest version 7.1.2-5 remains vulnerable to the same integer overflow attack. The patch added BMPOverflowCheck() but placed it after the overflow occurs, making it useless. A malicious 58-byte BMP file can trigger AddressSanitizer crashes and DoS. Affected Versions: ImageMagick < 7.1.2-2 (originally reported) ImageMagick 7.1.2-2 through 7.1.2-5 (incomplete patch) Platform and Configuration Requirements: 32-bit …
A format string bug vulnerability exists in InterpretImageFilename function where user input is directly passed to FormatLocaleString without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution.
Passing a geometry string containing only a colon (":") to montage -geometry leads GetGeometry() to set width/height to 0. Later, ThumbnailImage() divides by these zero dimensions, triggering a crash (SIGFPE/abort), resulting in a denial of service.
A 32-bit integer overflow in the BMP encoder’s scanline-stride computation collapses bytes_per_line (stride) to a tiny value while the per-row writer still emits 3 × width bytes for 24-bpp images. The row base pointer advances using the (overflowed) stride, so the first row immediately writes past its slot and into adjacent heap memory with attacker-controlled bytes. This is a classic, powerful primitive for heap corruption in common auto-convert pipelines. Impact: …
Vulnerability Details The magnified size calculations in ReadOneMNGIMage (in coders/png.c) are unsafe and can overflow, leading to memory corruption. The source snippet below is heavily abbreviated due to the size of the function, but hopefully the important points are captured. static Image ReadOneMNGImage(MngReadInfo mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception) { // Lots of stuff, this is effectively a state machine for the MNG rendering commands, // skip to the point where …
Vulnerability Details When performing image magnification in ReadOneMNGIMage (in coders/png.c), there is an issue around the handling of images with separate alpha channels. When loading an image with a color type that implies a separate alpha channel (ie. jng_color_type >= 12), we will load the alpha pixels in this loop: if (logging != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " Reading alpha from alpha_blob."); jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception); if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL) for (y=0; …
Target: ImageMagick (commit ecc9a5eb456747374bae8e07038ba10b3d8821b3) Type: Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in splay tree cloning callback Impact: Deterministic abort under UBSan (DoS in sanitizer builds). No crash in a non-sanitized build; likely low security impact. Trigger: Minimal 2-byte input parsed via MagickWand, then coalescing.
In ImageMagick's magick mogrify command, specifying multiple consecutive %d format specifiers in a filename template causes internal pointer arithmetic to generate an address below the beginning of the stack buffer, resulting in a stack overflow through vsnprintf().
In ImageMagick's magick stream command, specifying multiple consecutive %d format specifiers in a filename template causes a memory leak.
While Processing a crafted TIFF file, imagemagick crashes.
A heap buffer overflow was identified in the InterpretImageFilename function of ImageMagick. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (%%).
Infinite lines occur when writing during a specific XMP file conversion command