protobufjs 8.2.0 added support for preserving unknown fields encountered during binary decode. Affected versions preserved unknown wire elements in message.$unknowns and did not provide a decode-time option to discard unknown fields before retaining them. A crafted protobuf payload containing many unknown fields could therefore cause a decoded message to retain substantially more memory than the input size would suggest, even when unknown-field round-tripping is not needed. protobufjs 8.5.0 added the …
protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated toObject() conversion and the custom google.protobuf.Any JSON conversion path. A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested Any values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON.
protobufjs accepted certain schema-derived names that could collide with properties used by protobufjs runtime helpers. The known affected names are fields named hasOwnProperty, field or oneof names such as $type when loaded through protobufjs JSON/reflection descriptors, and service methods whose generated helper name is rpcCall. When affected message or service types were used, protobufjs could read schema-controlled data where it expected an own-property helper, reflected type metadata, or the base …
protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while expanding nested JSON descriptors through Root.fromJSON() and Namespace.addJSON(). A crafted JSON descriptor with deeply nested namespace definitions could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during descriptor loading.
protobufjs includes a minimal UTF-8 decoder used in non-Node and fallback decoding paths. The affected decoder accepted overlong UTF-8 byte sequences and decoded them to their canonical characters instead of replacing them. The issue concerns overlong encodings and code points outside the Unicode range. protobufjs may still accept some non-strict UTF-8 input for compatibility, so applications should not rely on protobufjs as a general-purpose strict UTF-8 validator.
protobufjs generated message constructors copied enumerable properties from a provided properties object without filtering the proto key. If an application constructed a message from an attacker-controlled plain object, an own enumerable proto property could alter the prototype of that individual message instance.
protobufjs allowed certain schema option paths to traverse through inherited object properties while applying options. A crafted protobuf schema or JSON descriptor could cause option handling to write to properties on global JavaScript constructors, corrupting process-wide built-in functionality.
protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while decoding nested protobuf data. This affected both skipping unknown group fields and generated decoding of nested message fields. A crafted protobuf binary payload could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during decoding.
protobufjs generated JavaScript property accessors from schema-controlled field and oneof names. Certain control characters in field names were not escaped before being embedded into generated function bodies. A crafted schema or JSON descriptor could therefore cause generated encode, decode, verify, or conversion functions to fail during compilation.
protobufjs generated JavaScript for toObject conversion could include an unsafe expression derived from a schema-controlled bytes field default value. A crafted descriptor with a non-string default value for a bytes field could cause attacker-controlled code to be emitted into the generated conversion function.
protobufjs used plain objects with inherited prototypes for internal type lookup tables used by generated encode and decode functions. If Object.prototype had already been polluted, those lookup tables could resolve attacker-controlled inherited properties as valid protobuf type information. This could cause attacker-controlled strings to be emitted into generated JavaScript code.
protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JS functions. Attackers can manipulate these definitions to execute arbitrary JS code.
protobufjs could execute generated JavaScript code derived from protobuf schema metadata. When loading a crafted JSON descriptor, schema-controlled type names and type references could reach runtime code generation without sufficient validation.