follow-redirects 1.16.0 and 1.16.1 validate the documented sensitiveHeaders option with instanceof Array. An array created in another JavaScript realm is silently replaced with an empty list, so a caller-declared custom credential header can be forwarded to an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect destination.
follow-redirects 1.16.0 introduced the sensitiveHeaders option (the fix for CVE-2026-40895 / GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653), which lets an application declare extra header names that must be removed when a redirect crosses to a different host or downgrades protocol. The filter is a single case-insensitive regular expression built by concatenating the declared header names into an alternation after passing each through escapeRegex. escapeRegex escapes only a partial set of metacharacters and leaves ^, |, …
follow-redirects removes sensitive credential headers (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, and any caller-declared sensitiveHeaders) before following a redirect that crosses to a different host or downgrades to a less secure protocol. The removal routine iterates the caller's headers container with for…in and matches header names against a filter. This assumes the headers container is a plain object keyed by header names. Node's underlying http.request, which follow-redirects is a drop-in replacement for, also …
When an HTTP request follows a cross-domain redirect (301/302/307/308), follow-redirects only strips authorization, proxy-authorization, and cookie headers (matched by regex at index.js:469-476). Any custom authentication header (e.g., X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key, Token) is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target. Since follow-redirects is the redirect-handling dependency for axios (105K+ stars), this vulnerability affects the entire axios ecosystem.