OpenClaw/Clawdbot has OS Command Injection via Project Root Path in sshNodeCommand
Two related vulnerabilities existed in the macOS application's SSH remote connection handling (CommandResolver.swift):
Two related vulnerabilities existed in the macOS application's SSH remote connection handling (CommandResolver.swift):
The Control UI trusts gatewayUrl from the query string without validation and auto-connects on load, sending the stored gateway token in the WebSocket connect payload. Clicking a crafted link or visiting a malicious site can send the token to an attacker-controlled server. The attacker can then connect to the victim's local gateway, modify config (sandbox, tool policies), and invoke privileged actions, achieving 1-click RCE. This vulnerability is exploitable even on …
A Command Injection vulnerability existed in Clawdbot’s Docker sandbox execution mechanism due to unsafe handling of the PATH environment variable when constructing shell commands. An authenticated user able to control environment variables could influence command execution within the container context. This issue has been fixed and regression tests have been added to prevent reintroduction.
Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-g8p2-7wf7-98mq. This link is maintained to preserve external references. Original Description OpenClaw (aka clawdbot or Moltbot) before 2026.1.29 obtains a gatewayUrl value from a query string and automatically makes a WebSocket connection without prompting, sending a token value.