Advisories for Npm/@Tsparticles/Mcp-Server package

The HTTP server mode of @tsparticles/mcp-server accumulates all incoming request body chunks into an in-memory Buffer[] array with no size limit before calling JSON.parse. An unauthenticated remote attacker can stream an arbitrarily large body to POST /mcp, exhausting the Node.js process memory and causing a Denial of Service. The official Docker image ships with HTTP mode enabled by default (–port 3000 on 0.0.0.0), making this exploitable without any special configuration …

The HTTP mode of @tsparticles/mcp-server parses incoming /mcp request bodies with JSON.parse() outside a request-local error boundary. A single malformed JSON request causes the async request handler to throw and terminates the Node.js process. This was verified on v4.3.0 at commit 0266d469aa2d719cb66a9c6bf09aded4186ec17c. Version 4.3.1 appears to fix this by returning HTTP 400 for invalid JSON.

The HTTP mode of @tsparticles/mcp-server creates a single stateful StreamableHTTPServerTransport instance and reuses it for all clients. The first anonymous client that initializes the MCP endpoint claims the shared transport state, and later clients cannot create their own sessions. This was verified on v4.3.0 at commit 0266d469aa2d719cb66a9c6bf09aded4186ec17c. The same singleton transport pattern is still present in v4.3.1 and current main.