Several API endpoints in authenticated mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed. Verified against the latest version. Discord: sagi03581
Paperclip contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows an attacker with an Agent API key to execute arbitrary OS commands on the Paperclip server host. An attacker with an agent credential can escalate privileges from the agent runtime to the Paperclip server host. The vulnerability occurs because agents are allowed to update their own adapterConfig via the /agents/:id API endpoint. The configuration field adapterConfig.workspaceStrategy.provisionCommand is later executed by the server …
Paperclip contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows an attacker with an Agent API key to execute arbitrary OS commands on the Paperclip server host. An attacker with an agent credential can escalate privileges from the agent runtime to the Paperclip server host. The vulnerability occurs because agents are allowed to update their own adapterConfig via the /agents/:id API endpoint. The configuration field adapterConfig.workspaceStrategy.provisionCommand is later executed by the server …
A critical OS command injection vulnerability exists in Paperclip's execution workspace lifecycle. An attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands into the cleanupCommand field via the PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id endpoint. When the workspace is archived, the server executes this command verbatim via child_process.spawn(shell, ["-c", cleanupCommand]) with no input validation or sanitization. In local_trusted mode (the default for desktop installations), this requires zero authentication. Three independent proofs of exploitation were demonstrated on Windows …
An arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the workspace runtime service allows any agent to execute shell commands on the server, exposing all environment variables including API keys, JWT secrets, and database credentials.
POST /api/agents/:id/keys, GET /api/agents/:id/keys, and DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId (server/src/routes/agents.ts lines 2050-2087) only call assertBoard to authorize the caller. They never call assertCompanyAccess and never verify that the caller is a member of the company that owns the target agent. Any authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero company memberships and no instance_admin role) can mint a plaintext pcp_* agent API token for any agent in any company on …
The GET, POST, and DELETE handlers under /agents/:id/keys in the Paperclip control-plane API only call assertBoard(req), which verifies that the caller has a board-type session but does not verify that the caller has access to the company owning the target agent. A board user whose membership is limited to Company A can therefore list, create, or revoke agent API keys for any agent in Company B by supplying the victim …
The approval-resolution endpoints (POST /approvals/:id/approve, /reject, /request-revision) accept a client-supplied decidedByUserId field in the request body and write it verbatim into the authoritative approvals.decidedByUserId column — without cross-checking it against the authenticated actor. Any board user who can access an approval's company can record the decision as having been made by another user (e.g. the CEO), forging the governance audit trail. For hire_agent approvals with a monthly budget, the same …
An unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in authenticated mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target's address. The entire chain is six API calls. I verified every step against the latest version. I have a fully automated PoC script and a video recording available. Discord: sagi03581
An unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in authenticated mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target's address. The entire chain is six API calls. I verified every step against the latest version. I have a fully automated PoC script and a video recording available. Discord: sagi03581