The resend-verification-code endpoint allows any authenticated user to trigger a verification code resend for any UserWhatsApp record by ID. Ownership is not validated (unlike the verify endpoint).
OneUptime Synthetic Monitors allow a low-privileged authenticated project user to execute arbitrary commands on the oneuptime-probe server/container. The root cause is that untrusted Synthetic Monitor code is executed inside Node's vm while live host-realm Playwright browser and page objects are exposed to it. A malicious user can call Playwright APIs on the injected browser object and cause the probe to spawn an attacker-controlled executable. This is a server-side remote code …
A low‑privileged user can bypass authorization and tenant isolation in OneUptime v10.0.20 by sending a forged is-multi-tenant-query header together with a controlled projectid header. Because the server trusts this client-supplied header, internal permission checks in BasePermission are skipped and tenant scoping is disabled. This allows attackers to: Access project data belonging to other tenants Read sensitive User fields via nested relations Leak plaintext resetPasswordToken Reset the victim’s password and fully …
OneUptime's GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled state and installation_id values and updates Project.gitHubAppInstallationId with isRoot: true without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project's GitHub App installation binding. Related GitHub endpoints also lack effective authorization, so a valid installation ID can be used to enumerate repositories and create CodeRepository records in an arbitrary project.
OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment …
OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment …
Summary OneUptime Synthetic Monitors allow low-privileged project users to submit custom Playwright code that is executed on the oneuptime-probe service. In the current implementation, this untrusted code is run inside Node's vm and is given live host Playwright objects such as browser and page. This creates a distinct server-side RCE primitive: the attacker does not need the classic this.constructor.constructor(…) sandbox escape. Instead, the attacker can directly use the injected Playwright …
Summary OneUptime Synthetic Monitors allow low-privileged project users to submit custom Playwright code that is executed on the oneuptime-probe service. In the current implementation, this untrusted code is run inside Node's vm and is given live host Playwright objects such as browser and page. This creates a distinct server-side RCE primitive: the attacker does not need the classic this.constructor.constructor(…) sandbox escape. Instead, the attacker can directly use the injected Playwright …
The WebAuthn authentication implementation does not store the challenge on the server side. Instead, the challenge is returned to the client and accepted back from the client request body during verification. This violates the WebAuthn specification (W3C Web Authentication Level 2, §13.4.3) and allows an attacker who has obtained a valid WebAuthn assertion (e.g., via XSS, MitM, or log exposure) to replay it indefinitely, completely bypassing the second-factor authentication.
An OS command injection vulnerability in NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute() allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field.
OneUptime lets project members write custom JavaScript that runs inside monitors. The problem is it executes that code using Node.js's built-in vm module, which Node.js itself documents as "not a security mechanism — do not use it to run untrusted code." The classic one-liner escape gives full access to the underlying process, and since the probe runs with host networking and holds all cluster credentials in its environment, this turns …
A low-permission user can create new accounts through a direct API request instead of being restricted to the intended interface.
During the login process, the server response included a parameter called isMasterAdmin. By intercepting and modifying this parameter value from false to true, a user is able to gain access to the admin dashboard interface. However, despite accessing the admin panel, the user does not have sufficient permissions to view or interact with actual data.
This advisory duplicates another.