@libp2p/gossipsub StrictSign validation does not bind a supplied message public key to the claimed from peer ID when from is an RSA-style peer ID that does not inline its public key. An attacker can set from to a victim RSA peer ID, sign the message with the attacker's own private key, include the attacker's public key in msg.key, and have the message accepted as a valid signed message from the …
gossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call. The two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is …
Three cooperating omissions in @libp2p/gossipsub allow an unauthenticated single peer to exhaust the Node.js heap of any gossipsub node with default options. defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxSubscriptions = Infinity (packages/gossipsub/src/message/decodeRpc.ts:11): no decode-level cap on subscription entries per RPC. handleReceivedSubscription is unbounded (gossipsub.ts:1009-1021): every unique topic string creates a new Map entry + Set object in this.topics with no per-peer count limit. removePeer leaves empty Sets (gossipsub.ts:782-784): after peer disconnect, empty Sets are never deleted …