Advisories for Npm/@Hulumi/Policies package

2026

@hulumi/policies has a HULUMI-H5 bypass via decoy sibling resources targeting a different bucket

HULUMI-H1 forbids raw aws:s3:Bucket outside of Hulumi's SecureBucket component, with one exemption: a raw bucket that's a child of a SecureBucket is allowed because the component is responsible for the hardening. HULUMI-H5 is the defence-in-depth check that closes the H1 exemption — for any raw bucket claiming it, H5 verifies the five hardening sibling resources a real SecureBucket always emits (public-access block, SSE-KMS, ownership controls, versioning, TLS-only bucket policy) are …

@hulumi/policies bypasses policy packs with a forged Pulumi-URN logical name

Pulumi gives every cloud resource a structured URN that includes the resource's type chain (hulumi:baseline:aws:SecureBucket$aws:s3/bucketV2:BucketV2) and the logical name the developer freely chose (anything after the final ::). Several Hulumi policy rules used the URN to grant exemptions — for example, "if this raw bucket is a child of SecureBucket, skip the raw-bucket rule because the parent component handles hardening." The bug: the rules looked for a substring like hulumi:baseline:aws:SecureBucket$ …

@hulumi/policies bypasses IAM-role policy checks when the role trusts multiple OIDC providers

AWS IAM trust policies can list more than one federated identity provider — for example, a role that accepts BOTH GitHub Actions OIDC and Google's OIDC. The G_OIDC_1 and G_OIDC_2 policy rules are supposed to flag IAM roles whose GitHub-OIDC trust is too permissive (e.g. wildcard sub: conditions that would let any branch or any pull request assume the role). The bug: when the role's Principal.Federated field was a JSON …

@hulumi/policies: Stack-wide evidence bypassed Cloudflare and deployment-governance guardrails

Impact: @hulumi/policies versions before 1.3.2 used stack-wide evidence shortcuts in several Cloudflare and deployment-governance validators. Unrelated compliant-looking evidence could suppress violations for different zones, hostnames, origins, or repositories in the same stack. Patched in 1.3.2: validators now correlate evidence to the specific protected resource and include regression coverage for unrelated-evidence bypasses. Remediation: upgrade @hulumi/policies to 1.3.2 or later.

@hulumi/policies: HULUMI-H1 SecureBucket parent spoof bypass

Impact: @hulumi/policies versions before 1.3.2 could accept spoofed SecureBucket parent evidence for HULUMI-H1, allowing policy evaluation to miss an unsafe bucket shape. Patched in 1.3.2: the validator now correlates evidence to the expected component/resource relationship and includes regression coverage. Remediation: upgrade @hulumi/policies to 1.3.2 or later.

@hulumi/policies: GitHub OIDC trust policy bypass via AWS set-qualified condition operators

Impact: @hulumi/policies versions before 1.3.2 only checked exact AWS IAM StringLike/StringEquals condition operator keys in G_OIDC_1. Set-qualified operators such as ForAnyValue:StringLike could hide wildcard GitHub Actions OIDC sub conditions from the mandatory guardrail. Patched in 1.3.2: the AWS trust-policy inspector now evaluates set-qualified string operators and rejects unsafe GitHub OIDC sub conditions. Remediation: upgrade @hulumi/policies to 1.3.2 or later.

@hulumi/policies: CIS 1.16 admin policy bypass for inline and attached IAM policies

Impact: @hulumi/policies versions before 1.3.2 did not fully inspect inline and attached IAM policy evidence for the administrator-policy guardrail, so some admin-equivalent policy paths could pass policy evaluation. Patched in 1.3.2: the validator inspects the affected policy shapes and includes regression tests. Remediation: upgrade @hulumi/policies to 1.3.2 or later.