Advisories for Npm/@Angular/Ssr package

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash () bypass. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header: An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., \evil.com). The internal validation failed to …

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and X-Forwarded-* family to determine the application's base origin without any validation of the destination domain. Specifically, the framework didn't have checks for the following: Host Domain: The Host and X-Forwarded-Host headers were not checked …

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., ///evil.com). The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router redirectTo or i18n …

The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (@angular/ssr). The function createRequestUrl uses the native URL constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., originalUrl or url) begins with a double forward slash (//) or backslash (\), the URL constructor treats it as a schema-relative URL. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the …

Angular uses a DI container (the "platform injector") to hold request-specific state during server-side rendering. For historical reasons, the container was stored as a JavaScript module-scoped global variable. When multiple requests are processed concurrently, they could inadvertently share or overwrite the global injector state. In practical terms, this can lead to one request responding with data meant for a completely different request, leaking data or tokens included on the rendered …