Advisories for Maven/Org.apache.camel/Camel-Sjms package

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!*', or the no-'javax.' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that …

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the …

JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms, and the equivalent JmsBinding class in camel-sjms, deserialized the payload of incoming JMS ObjectMessage values via javax.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() without applying any ObjectInputFilter, class allowlist or class denylist. Because this code path is reached whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer, an attacker able to publish a crafted ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by a Camel application could achieve …

The fix for CVE-2025-27636 added setLowerCase(true) to HttpHeaderFilterStrategy so that case-variant header names such as 'CAmelExecCommandExecutable' are filtered out alongside 'CamelExecCommandExecutable'. The same setLowerCase(true) call was not applied to five non-HTTP HeaderFilterStrategy implementations: JmsHeaderFilterStrategy and ClassicJmsHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-jms, SjmsHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-sjms, CoAPHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-coap, and GooglePubsubHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-google-pubsub. Because those strategies use case-sensitive String.startsWith('Camel'/'camel') filtering while the Camel Exchange stores headers in a case-insensitive map, an attacker with JMS (or …