Advisories for Maven/Org.apache.camel/Camel-Cxf-Rest package

2026

Apache Camel-CXF: The SOAP operation-selection headers used non-Camel-prefixed names (operationName, operationNamespace) that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to redirect the invoked SOAP operation

Improper Input Validation, Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') vulnerability in Apache Camel CXF SOAP component. The camel-cxf producer selects which SOAP operation to invoke on the backend service from the operationName (and operationNamespace) Exchange header, whose constant values (CxfConstants.OPERATION_NAME / OPERATION_NAMESPACE) were the plain strings operationName / operationNamespace. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace …

Camel-CXF and Camel-Knative Message Header are Vulnerable to Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering

Camel-CXF and Camel-Knative Message Header Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering The CXF and Knative HeaderFilterStrategy implementations (CxfRsHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-cxf-rest, CxfHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-cxf-transport, and KnativeHttpHeaderFilterStrategy in camel-knative-http) only filter outbound Camel-internal headers via setOutFilterStartsWith, while not configuring inbound filtering via setInFilterStartsWith. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can inject Camel-internal headers (e.g. CamelExecCommandExecutable, CamelFileName) via HTTP requests to CXF-RS or CXF-SOAP endpoints. When a route forwards messages from these endpoints to …