Advisories for Maven/Com.oviva.telematik/Epa4all-Client package

An attacker who can MITM the TLS connection between the client and the IDP (within the TI network) can substitute a forged discovery document. The forged document redirects u ri_puk_idp_enc and uri_puk_idp_sig to attacker-controlled URLs. The client then encrypts the SMC-B-signed challenge response to the attacker's encryption key and POSTs it to the attacker's auth endpoint. This captures the signed authentication material.

An attacker on the network path between the ePA service and the Konnektor can present any TLS certificate (self-signed, expired, wrong CN) and intercept all SOAP traffic. This includes patient identifiers (KVNR), SMC-B card operations (authentication, signing), document content, and credential exchanges.

In SignedPublicKeysTrustValidatorImpl.isTrusted(), the ECDSA signature verification at line 45 discards the boolean return value of Signature.verify(). The method performs certificate chain validation, OCSP check, and signature algorithm setup, but never checks whether the signature actually matches. For any structurally valid signature, it returns true.