Advisories for Maven/Com.fasterxml.jackson.core/Jackson-Databind package

2026

jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution

A java.nio.file.Path field bound from untrusted JSON reaches JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize. The attacker string flows through new URI(value) → Path.of(uri), then on FileSystemNotFoundException into a ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> enumeration that calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default JsonMapper.builder().build(). Impact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path …

jackson-databind: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54514: eager DNS resolution (SSRF) still present in InetAddress deserialization

CVE-2026-54514 (GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5) fixed an eager-DNS-resolution / SSRF issue in jackson-databind's deserialization of java.net.InetSocketAddress by switching to InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(…) (PR #5951, commit 1f5a1037, released in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4). That fix did not cover the sibling java.net.InetAddress branch in the very same FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() switch statement, which still calls InetAddress.getByName(value) and therefore performs an eager forward DNS lookup on attacker-controlled input at deserialization time. The fix is incomplete: the same vulnerability class …

jackson-databind: Duration XMLGregorianCalendar Unbounded Number Parse DoS

jackson-databind 3.2.1 deserializes a JSON string bound to a javax.xml.datatype.Duration or javax.xml.datatype.XMLGregorianCalendar field by passing the raw string verbatim to DatatypeFactory.newDuration(value) / newXMLGregorianCalendar(value). Per the XML-Schema lexical grammar these factory methods accept numeric components of arbitrary length, which the JDK materializes into java.math.BigInteger / BigDecimal using the native BigInteger(String) constructor (an O(n²) parser). Because the digits reside inside a JSON string token, jackson-core's StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength guard (which bounds only JSON number …

jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)

DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to …

jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)`

In BeanDeserializer.deserializeUsingPropertyBasedWithExternalTypeId, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to the regular bean-property branch; the creator-property branch performed no creatorProp.visibleInView(activeView) check. A constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(RestrictedView.class) and @JsonTypeInfo(use=Id.NAME, include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY) is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This is a patch gap. GHSA-5hh8 (CVE-2026-54517) and GHSA-rcqc (CVE-2026-54518) descriptions cover only the main property-based path and the unwrapped-creator path respectively; the external-type-id creator path …

jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays the buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property by iterating its properties and calling prop.deserializeAndSet() with no prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard — the exact guard processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() received in the #5971 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962 fix, and the guard BeanDeserializer.deserializeWithUnwrapped applies to directly-matched properties. As a result, a property annotated with both @JsonView(PrivilegedView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is written from attacker JSON even when deserializing under a more-restrictive active view. Correction to the original framing (runtime-verified): …

jackson-databind: @JsonIgnore on a Record property is bypassed with a PropertyNamingStrategy

For Java Records, POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records a @JsonIgnore-annotated component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the PropertyNamingStrategy. After the rename, _ignoredPropertyNames still holds only the pre-rename name, so _ignorableProps is built from the stale key. The renamed JSON key passes IgnorePropertiesUtil.shouldIgnore() and is assigned to the Record's constructor parameter, defeating the @JsonIgnore.

jackson-databind's renamed @JsonIgnore'd setters can deserialize via private fields

POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter.

jackson-databind: InetSocketAddress deserialization triggers eager DNS resolution (SSRF)

JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect.

jackson-databind: Deeply nested JsonNode throws StackOverflowError for toString()

Potential Denial-of-Service when attacker sends deeply nested JSON if (and only if) service: Reads deeply nested (1000s of levels) JSON as JsonNode (ObjectMapper.readTree()) Writes out same (or modifided) node using JsonNode.toString() which can consume significant amount of resources with concurrent relatively small requests (1000 nested arrays is 2kB).

jackson-databind has case-insensitive deserialization bypasses per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties

In BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again.

jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.

jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever …

jackson-databind has a @JsonView bypass for unwrapped creator parameters

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active.

jackson-databind has @JsonView bypass for setterless creator properties

In BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it.

2023

False Positive

jackson-databind through 2.15.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service or other unspecified impact via a crafted object that uses cyclic dependencies. NOTE: the vendor's perspective is that this is not a valid vulnerability report, because the steps of constructing a cyclic data structure and trying to serialize it cannot be achieved by an external attacker.

2022

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in Jackson-databind

In FasterXML jackson-databind 2.4.0-rc1 until 2.12.7.1 and in 2.13.x before 2.13.4.2 resource exhaustion can occur because of a lack of a check in primitive value deserializers to avoid deep wrapper array nesting, when the UNWRAP_SINGLE_VALUE_ARRAYS feature is enabled. This was patched in 2.12.7.1, 2.13.4.2, and 2.14.0. Commits that introduced vulnerable code are https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/d499f2e7bbc5ebd63af11e1f5cf1989fa323aa45, https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/0e37a39502439ecbaa1a5b5188387c01bf7f7fa1, and https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/7ba9ac5b87a9d6ac0d2815158ecbeb315ad4dcdc. Fix commits are https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/cd090979b7ea78c75e4de8a4aed04f7e9fa8deea and https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/d78d00ee7b5245b93103fef3187f70543d67ca33. The 2.13.4.1 release does fix this issue, however …

2021
2020

Deserialization of Untrusted Data

An issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind prior to 2.7.9.4, 2.8.11.2, and 2.9.6. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property), the service has the Oracle JDBC jar in the classpath, and an attacker can provide an LDAP service to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload.

Deserialization of Untrusted Data

A flaw was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind that permits polymorphic deserialization of malicious objects. Specifically when the xalan JNDI gadget is used in conjunction with polymorphic type handling methods such as enableDefaultTyping(). The gadget may also be combined with @JsonTypeInfo when it is using Id.CLASS or Id.MINIMAL_CLASS, or in any other way which ObjectMapper.readValue might instantiate objects from unsafe sources. An attacker could use this flaw to execute arbitrary code.

2019

Improper Input Validation

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the apache-log4j-extra in the classpath, and an attacker can provide a JNDI service to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload.

Improper Input Validation

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the p6spy jar in the classpath, and an attacker can find an RMI service endpoint to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload. This issue exists because of com.p6spy.engine.spy.P6DataSource mishandling.

Improper Input Validation

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the commons-dbcp jar in the classpath, and an attacker can find an RMI service endpoint to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload. This issue exists because of org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.SharedPoolDataSource and org.apache.commons.dbcp.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource mishandling.

Information Disclosure

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has JDOM in the classpath, an attacker can send a specifically crafted JSON message that allows them to read arbitrary local files on the server.

Information exposure in FasterXML jackson-databind

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.9. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint, the service has the mysql-connector-java jar (8.0.14 or earlier) in the classpath, and an attacker can host a crafted MySQL server reachable by the victim, an attacker can send a crafted JSON message that allows them to read arbitrary local …

jackson-databind Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability

An issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind prior to 2.7.9.4, 2.8.11.2, and 2.9.6. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property), the service has the Jodd-db jar (for database access for the Jodd framework) in the classpath, and an attacker can provide an LDAP service to access, it is possible to make the service execute a malicious payload.

2018