Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Xuri/Excelize/V2 package

Excelize's prior row-bound fix for GHSA-h69g / CVE-2026-54063 protects the checked worksheet parser, but the streaming worksheet reader used by Rows and GetRows does not enforce the same TotalRows bound on the row r attribute. A small XLSX file can set a row number above Excelize's maximum row (1048576) and omit the cell coordinate. GetRows then appends empty rows up to the attacker-controlled row index and returns success. This was …

Excelize parses shared-string cell values with strconv.Atoi and checks only the upper bound before indexing the shared string slice. If an XLSX file contains a shared-string cell with <v>-1</v>, the parsed index is negative. The upper-bound check still passes (len(sharedStrings) > -1), and Excelize indexes sharedStrings[-1], causing a runtime panic. This was reproduced on the current default branch commit 1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314 and the latest release tag v2.10.1 (5ad5ab3af0054c55bdce09f1530085600e9f2e45). The issue is …

The checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled <row r="N"> XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens …