Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Theupdateframework/Go-Tuf/V2 package

go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (repoName) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a repoName containing traversal (e.g., ../escaped-repo) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended LocalMetadataDir cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions.

A compromised or misconfigured TUF repository can have the configured value of signature thresholds set to 0, which effectively disables signature verification.

If the TUF repository (or any of its mirrors) returns invalid TUF metadata JSON (valid JSON but not well formed TUF metadata), the client will panic during parsing, causing a DoS. The panic happens before any signature is validated. This means that a compromised repository/mirror/cache can DoS clients without having access to any signing key.

During the ongoing work on the TUF conformance test suite, we have come across a test that reveals what we believe is a bug in go-tuf with security implications. The bug exists in go-tuf delegation tracing and could result in downloading the wrong artifact. We have come across this issue in the test in this PR: https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf-conformance/pull/115. The test - test_graph_traversal - sets up a repository with a series of …