Rekor’s cose v0.0.1 entry implementation can panic on attacker-controlled input when canonicalizing a proposed entry with an empty spec.message. validate() returns nil (success) when message is empty, leaving sign1Msg uninitialized, and Canonicalize() later dereferences v.sign1Msg.Payload.
/api/v1/index/retrieve supports retrieving a public key via a user-provided URL, allowing attackers to trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services. Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF.
Rekor's goals are to provide an immutable tamper resistant ledger of metadata generated within a software projects supply chain. A malformed proposed entry of the intoto/v0.0.2 type can cause a panic on a thread within the Rekor process. The thread is recovered so the client receives a 500 error message and service still continues, so the availability impact of this is minimal. This has been fixed in v1.2.0 of Rekor. …
Summary Two vulnerabilities have been found in Rekor types for archive files JARs and APKs, where Rekor would crash due to out of memory conditions caused by reading archive metadata files into memory without checking their sizes first causing a Denial of Service of Rekor. These vulnerabilities were found through fuzzing with OSS-Fuzz. Vulnerability 1: OOM due to large files in META-INF directory of JAR files. Summary Verification of a …