ClientIPFromXFF skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. The attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one …
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
The RealIP middleware in go-chi/chi is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.
The RealIP middleware in go-chi/chi is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.
The RedirectSlashes function in middleware/strip.go does not perform correct input validation and can lead to an open redirect vulnerability.
The RedirectSlashes function in middleware/strip.go does not perform correct input validation and can lead to an open redirect vulnerability.