Arcane v2.10.2 contains an authorization inconsistency in AuthMiddleware.managerAuth. When a request supplies a valid environment access token through the X-Arcane-Agent-Token header, managerAuth resolves the associated environment, installs an environment-scoped permission set, and immediately calls next(c). This occurs before the middleware evaluates the AdminRequired option and verifies that the caller is a global administrator. As a result, an environment-scoped access token can access routes protected with WithAdminRequired(), despite the corresponding EnvironmentPermissionSet …
A user holding the delegated users:update permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. UpdateUser sets the target user's PasswordHash from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by RequireGlobalAdmin, users:update is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.
ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project's compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: ['../../../../etc/passwd'], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including …
The PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint, which writes the system-wide .env.global file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like REGISTRY, IMAGE, DATABASE_URL, or SECRET_KEY that other users reference via ${VAR} in compose …
The unauthenticated GET /api/app-images/logo endpoint reflects a user-supplied color query parameter into the body of an SVG document via strings.ReplaceAll with no escaping. The substitution lands inside a <style> element of the embedded logo.svg, allowing an attacker to close the style block and inject executable <script> content. Because the response is served as image/svg+xml and Arcane sets no Content-Security-Policy or X-Content-Type-Options headers, navigating a logged-in admin victim to a crafted …
GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse accepts a path query parameter that is passed to a shell command (sh -c "find … | while …") inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks ../ traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks, and strconv.Quote only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper …
Arcane's huma-based REST API exposes nine endpoints under /api/customize/git-repositories and /api/git-repositories/sync for managing GitOps source repositories and their stored credentials. Eight of those endpoints (list, create, get, update, delete, test, listBranches, browseFiles) never call the checkAdmin(ctx) helper that every other admin-managed resource (container registries, environments, users, API keys, swarm, settings, system, notifications, events) uses, and the huma authentication middleware deliberately enforces only authentication, not the admin role. As a result, …
Four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing …
The /api/templates/fetch endpoint accepts a caller-supplied url parameter and performs a server-side HTTP GET request to that URL without authentication and without URL scheme or host validation. The server's response is returned directly to the caller. type. This constitutes an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any publicly reachable Arcane instance.
Arcane’s updater service supported lifecycle labels com.getarcaneapp.arcane.lifecycle.pre-update and com.getarcaneapp.arcane.lifecycle.post-update that allowed defining a command to run before or after a container update. The label value is passed directly to /bin/sh -c without sanitization or validation. Because any authenticated user (not limited to administrators) can create projects through the API, an attacker can create a project that specifies one of these lifecycle labels with a malicious command. When an administrator later …