Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Getarcaneapp/Arcane/Backend package

Four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing …

The /api/templates/fetch endpoint accepts a caller-supplied url parameter and performs a server-side HTTP GET request to that URL without authentication and without URL scheme or host validation. The server's response is returned directly to the caller. type. This constitutes an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any publicly reachable Arcane instance.

Arcane’s updater service supported lifecycle labels com.getarcaneapp.arcane.lifecycle.pre-update and com.getarcaneapp.arcane.lifecycle.post-update that allowed defining a command to run before or after a container update. The label value is passed directly to /bin/sh -c without sanitization or validation. Because any authenticated user (not limited to administrators) can create projects through the API, an attacker can create a project that specifies one of these lifecycle labels with a malicious command. When an administrator later …