Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Dgraph-Io/Dgraph/V24 package

Dgraph v25.3.2 still exposes the process command line through the unauthenticated /debug/vars endpoint on Alpha. Because the admin token is commonly supplied via the –security "token=…" startup flag, an unauthenticated attacker can retrieve that token and replay it in the X-Dgraph-AuthToken header to access admin-only endpoints. This is a variant of the previously fixed /debug/pprof/cmdline issue, but the current fix is incomplete because it blocks only /debug/pprof/cmdline and still serves …

A vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph's default configuration where ACL is not enabled. The attack is a single HTTP POST to /mutate?commitNow=true containing a crafted cond field in an upsert mutation. The cond value is concatenated directly into a DQL query string via strings.Builder.WriteString after only a cosmetic strings.Replace transformation. …

A vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph's default configuration where ACL is not enabled. The attack requires two HTTP POSTs to port 8080. The first sets up a schema predicate with @unique @index(exact) @lang via /alter (also unauthenticated in default config). The second sends a crafted JSON mutation to /mutate?commitNow=true where …

An unauthenticated debug endpoint in Dgraph Alpha exposes the full process command line, including the configured admin token from –security "token=…". This does not break token validation logic directly; instead, it discloses the credential and enables unauthorized admin-level access by reusing the leaked token in X-Dgraph-AuthToken.

The restoreTenant admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (admin.go:499-522), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar restore mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, restoreTenant executes with zero middleware. This mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including file:// for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF.