Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Dagu-Org/Dagu package

The fix for CVE-2026-27598 (commit e2ed589, PR #1691) added ValidateDAGName to CreateNewDAG and rewrote generateFilePath to use filepath.Base. This patched the CREATE path. The remaining API endpoints - GET, DELETE, RENAME, EXECUTE - all pass the {fileName} URL path parameter to locateDAG without calling ValidateDAGName. %2F-encoded forward slashes in the {fileName} segment traverse outside the DAGs directory.

The dagRunId request field accepted by the inline DAG execution endpoints is passed directly into filepath.Join to construct a temporary directory path without any format validation. Go's filepath.Join resolves .. segments lexically, so a caller can supply a value such as ".." to redirect the computed directory outside the intended /tmp/<name>/<id> path. A deferred cleanup function that calls os.RemoveAll on that directory then runs unconditionally when the HTTP handler returns, …

The CreateNewDAG API endpoint (POST /api/v1/dags) does not validate the DAG name before passing it to the file store. While RenameDAG calls core.ValidateDAGName() to reject names containing path separators (line 273 in dags.go), CreateNewDAG skips this validation entirely and passes user input directly to dagStore.Create(). In internal/persis/filedag/store.go, the generateFilePath function (line 493) checks if the name contains a path separator, and if so, resolves it via filepath.Abs(name) — completely ignoring …

Dagu's default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required — any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.