Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Containers/Podman/V5 package

Podman v4.4.0 added a feature where container checkpoints (from the podman container checkpoint command) could be distributed via OCI registry, and pulled from that registry and run via the podman run command. This allowed easy transfer of checkpoints between systems. However, checkpoints allow complete control of how the container is created - including full control of the container sandbox. When podman run detects a checkpoint, it will silently ignore all …

An container image that contains a environment variable with just a key and no value can trick podman into passing that variable from the host into the container. This is made worse by the fact that using an asterisk (*) will cause podman to pass all host variables into the container. So essentially a malicious image can exfiltrate all podman environment variables that are set in the session from where …

When running podman quadlet install –replace to replace a Quadlet file, if the original Quadlet is larger than the new Quadlet, the file would not be truncated and content from the original would be preserved. There is no risk of information leakage as the user already had access to the Quadlet in order to replace it, and in most cases, this would only lead to invalid Quadlet files (see https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/issues/29013). …

Running a malicous container image where the WORKDIR path contains a symlink can create a directory or modify ownership on the host filesystem. Modified ownership is less likely to happen as that requires help from an untrusted/malicious process that mutates the host filesystem tree during dereferencing of the WORKDIR path, to trigger a race condition.

A command injection vulnerability exists in Podman's HyperV machine backend. The VM image path is inserted into a PowerShell double-quoted string without sanitization, allowing $() subexpression injection.

A flaw was found in Podman. In a Containerfile or Podman, data written to RUN –mount=type=bind mounts during the podman build is not discarded. This issue can lead to files created within the container appearing in the temporary build context directory on the host, leaving the created files accessible.

The podman kube play command can overwrite host files when the kube file contains a ConfigMap or Secret volume mount and the volume already contains a symlink to a host file. This allows a malicious container to write to arbitrary files on the host BUT the attacker only controls the target path not the contents that will be written to the file. The contents are defined in the yaml file …

The podman machine init command fails to verify the TLS certificate when downloading the VM images from an OCI registry (which it does by default since 5.0.0) allowing a possible Man In The Middle attack.

A vulnerability exists in the bind-propagation option of the Dockerfile RUN –mount instruction. The system does not properly validate the input passed to this option, allowing users to pass arbitrary parameters to the mount instruction. This issue can be exploited to mount sensitive directories from the host into a container during the build process and, in some cases, modify the contents of those mounted files. Even if SELinux is used, …

A flaw was found in Podman. This issue may allow an attacker to create a specially crafted container that, when configured to share the same IPC with at least one other container, can create a large number of IPC resources in /dev/shm. The malicious container will continue to exhaust resources until it is out-of-memory (OOM) killed. While the malicious container's cgroup will be removed, the IPC resources it created are …

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? Users running containers with root privileges allowing a container to run with read/write access to the host system files when selinux is not enabled. With selinux enabled, some read access is allowed.