Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Babylonlabs-Io/Babylon package

2025

Babylon Incorrect FP inactive accounting in costaking creates “phantom stake” that earns rewards after BTC unbond

A state consistency bug in x/costaking can leave a BTC delegator with non-zero ActiveSatoshis (Phatom Stake) even after they have fully unbonded their BTC delegation, if their Finality Provider (FP) drops out of the active set in the exact same babylon block height. This creates a “phantom stake”: the delegator’s BTC capital is withdrawn, the FP is inactive, but costaking continues to treat the delegation as active BTC stake allowing …

Babylon Incorrect FP inactive accounting in costaking creates “phantom stake” that earns rewards after BTC unbond

A state consistency bug in x/costaking can leave a BTC delegator with non-zero ActiveSatoshis (Phatom Stake) even after they have fully unbonded their BTC delegation, if their Finality Provider (FP) drops out of the active set in the exact same babylon block height. This creates a “phantom stake”: the delegator’s BTC capital is withdrawn, the FP is inactive, but costaking continues to treat the delegation as active BTC stake allowing …

Babylon Incorrect FP inactive accounting in costaking creates “phantom stake” that earns rewards after BTC unbond

A state consistency bug in x/costaking can leave a BTC delegator with non-zero ActiveSatoshis (Phatom Stake) even after they have fully unbonded their BTC delegation, if their Finality Provider (FP) drops out of the active set in the exact same babylon block height. This creates a “phantom stake”: the delegator’s BTC capital is withdrawn, the FP is inactive, but costaking continues to treat the delegation as active BTC stake allowing …

Babylon Incorrect FP inactive accounting in costaking creates “phantom stake” that earns rewards after BTC unbond

A state consistency bug in x/costaking can leave a BTC delegator with non-zero ActiveSatoshis (Phatom Stake) even after they have fully unbonded their BTC delegation, if their Finality Provider (FP) drops out of the active set in the exact same babylon block height. This creates a “phantom stake”: the delegator’s BTC capital is withdrawn, the FP is inactive, but costaking continues to treat the delegation as active BTC stake allowing …

Babylon Nil BlockHash in BLS vote extensions triggers panics in consensus handlers

A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.

Babylon Nil BlockHash in BLS vote extensions triggers panics in consensus handlers

A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.

Babylon Nil BlockHash in BLS vote extensions triggers panics in consensus handlers

A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.

Babylon Nil BlockHash in BLS vote extensions triggers panics in consensus handlers

A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.

Babylon Integer Overflow in Distribution Module CumulativeRewardRatio Calculation Leading to Chain Halt

Minting large amount of tokens through ibc transfer and then depositing them in validator rewards pool (via DepositValidatorRewardsPool message) can lead to integer overflow panic when calculating cumulative_reward_ratio for the validator. This calculation happens in x/epoching module EndBlocker, thus the panic will halt the chain.

Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack

A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, …