In affected releases, the link and email marks did not prevent XSS payloads from being submitted to the writer field's content data: The link mark allowed users to enter JavaScript URLs using the "custom" URL type. These URLs would already be sanitized by the backend before storing the malicious link in the content file. However, the link may be clicked by the same user who entered it before the content …
In affected releases, header values passed to Remote were handed to the cURL request library without removing newline characters: The headers option accepted arbitrary strings as header values and forwarded them to the underlying cURL request unchanged. A value containing \r\n was written verbatim to the socket and therefore split into several header lines on the wire. For example, a single X-Foo header value of "Bar\r\nX-Injected: pwned" produced two separate …
In affected releases, the isLocal check for the installation logic did not properly take the Forwarded: for=… header into account. This header is set by modern reverse proxy servers. It also did not take into account the X-Client-IP or X-Real-IP headers, which are set by some custom reverse proxy setups. This caused Kirby to falsely assume that an installation request was local and allowed creating an admin account even though …
In affected releases, Dom::sanitize() did not sanitize nodes that had been unwrapped from their parent node. The affected child nodes would be copied into the resulting sanitized document without being sanitized. An authenticated Panel user who can edit a writer or list field can store markup that survives sanitization and executes as JavaScript when the content is rendered, both in the Panel and on the site frontend. This allows a …
In affected releases, the clean file redirects didn't take access logic for drafts into account. When a file stored in a draft page was accessed via its clean file URL, Kirby immediately redirected to the physical media URL without first checking whether the draft page was accessible to the user or visitor. This only affected top-level drafts (direct children of the site) because clean file URLs currently don't work for …
In affected releases, the backend logic did not validate that the user-provided parent page or site was accessible to the current user. This allowed authenticated attackers with knowledge of the full path to an existing page to confirm the existence of a particular page and to retrieve the value of the title field of that page. This could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information.
In affected releases, Kirby did not check whether the queried pages were accessible to the currently authenticated user. This can lead to disclosure of sensitive information contained in inaccessible pages, including the confirmation of the existence of individual pages as well as disclosure of sensitive content fields stored in the pages. Linked children, siblings, or files were not affected by this vulnerability as they were already properly filtered by the …
In affected releases, this lock information was returned without checking whether the requesting user had permission to access or list the locking user. This allowed a low-privilege authenticated Panel user, whose role was configured with users.access: false or users.list: false, to learn the email address and identifier of any user who currently had a model open for editing in the Panel, including administrators and other higher-privilege users. Content locks are …
In affected releases, the underlying URL methods for these components did not filter out malicious URL values that resolve to script execution. While simple javascript: URLs were already deactivated by treating them as a relative path and prepending a single slash to the URL, the use of URLs of the format javascript://x%0A… bypasses this protection. The vbscript:, data:, livescript:, mocha: and jar: schemes are affected by the same underlying gap. …
In affected releases, Kirby allowed page drafts to be rendered if any valid user was authenticated, even if that user did not have access to the specific page model. Authenticated attackers with knowledge of the full path to an existing page draft could then access the rendered frontend page. This could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, e.g. ahead of the launch of a new product or post.
In affected releases, Kirby did not securely sanitize the contents of list fields on save. This allowed attackers to inject malicious HTML code into the content file by sending it to Kirby's API directly without using the Panel. This malicious HTML code would then be displayed on the site frontend and executed in the browsers of site visitors and logged in users who are browsing the site.
In affected releases, Kirby did not correctly validate the provided user ID, causing a path traversal vulnerability. This vulnerability results in the following impact: Arbitrary PHP file inclusion of files with the filename index.php (e.g. the main PHP files of plugins), the impact of which depends on the contents and logic inside the includable files. Probing of the existence of arbitrary directories on the server, which can allow attackers to …
In affected releases, Kirby did not validate the model attributes that were used in the collection queries. This allowed attackers to include arbitrary model methods in their queries. This includes methods with sensitive data such as password() (disclosing the password hash) or root() (disclosing the absolute filesystem path on the server) as well as methods that perform impactful actions such as loginPasswordless() (causing a privilege escalation to another user) or …
Kirby's user permissions control which user role is allowed to perform specific actions in the CMS. These permissions are defined for each role in the user blueprint (site/blueprints/users/…). The permissions control the authorization of user actions (with handling of model-specific authorization omitted here for brevity). Kirby provides the access.system permission (among others) that controls access to the system area of the Kirby Panel. This area contains internal system information like …
Kirby's user permissions control which user role is allowed to perform specific actions to content models in the CMS. These permissions are defined for each role in the user blueprint (site/blueprints/users/…). It is also possible to customize the permissions for each target model in the model blueprints (such as in site/blueprints/pages/…) using the options feature. The permissions and options together control the authorization of user actions. In affected releases, Kirby …
Kirby's user permissions control which user role is allowed to perform specific actions to content models in the CMS. These permissions are defined for each role in the user blueprint (site/blueprints/users/…). It is also possible to customize the permissions for each target model using the options feature (for user models again in the user blueprints). The permissions and options together control the authorization of user actions. Kirby provides the user.update …
Kirby's user permissions control which user role is allowed to perform specific actions to content models in the CMS. These permissions are defined for each role in the user blueprint (site/blueprints/users/…). It is also possible to customize the permissions for each target model in the model blueprints (such as in site/blueprints/pages/…) using the options feature. The permissions and options together control the authorization of user actions. Kirby provides the pages.access, …
Kirby's user permissions control which user role is allowed to perform specific actions to content models in the CMS. These permissions are defined for each role in the user blueprint (site/blueprints/users/…). It is also possible to customize the permissions for each target model in the model blueprints (such as in site/blueprints/pages/…) using the options feature. The permissions and options together control the authorization of user actions. Kirby provides the pages.create, …
Kirby's user permissions control which user role is allowed to perform specific actions to content models in the CMS. These permissions are defined for each role in the user blueprint (site/blueprints/users/…). It is also possible to customize the permissions for each target model in the model blueprints (such as in site/blueprints/pages/…) using the options feature. The permissions and options together control the authorization of user actions. For pages, Kirby provides …
Kirby's Xml::value() method has special handling for <![CDATA[ ]]> blocks. If the input value is already valid CDATA, it is not escaped a second time but allowed to pass through. However it was possible to trick this check into allowing values that only contained a valid CDATA block but also contained other structured data outside of the CDATA block. This structured data would then also be allowed to pass through, …
Kirby provides field types (checkboxes, color, multiselect, select, radio, tags and toggles) that offer a fixed set of options from a configured list. This configured list can be statically defined in the blueprint or it can come from a Kirby query or (external) API source. Options coming from a query or API are treated as dynamic. Static options can contain queries in the form {{ query }} or {< query …
This advisory has been withdrawn.
The missing permission checks allowed attackers with Panel access to create or discard a changes version or update the content fields in an existing changes version. All of these actions could affect arbitrary models. This could cause the following impact: Attackers could maliciously create changes versions for all models of the site, creating editing locks that would prevent other authenticated users from making content changes until those locks were cleared. …