Advisories for Cargo/Rustls-Webpki package

If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored. The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates. This vulnerability is …

When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building. Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected. We now give each path building operation a budget of 100 signature verifications. The original webpki crate is also affected, see GHSA-8qv2-5vq6-g2g7. This was previously reported in the original …