Advisories for Cargo/Mise package

Mise processes .tool-versions files through the Tera template engine during parsing, with the exec() function registered, enabling arbitrary command execution. Unlike .mise.toml files, .tool-versions files are not subject to trust verification in non-paranoid mode. This means an attacker can place a malicious .tool-versions file in a git repository, and when a victim with mise activated cds into the directory, arbitrary commands execute without any trust prompt.

mise loads trust-control settings from a local project .mise.toml before the trust check runs. An attacker who can place a malicious .mise.toml in a repository can make that same file appear trusted and then reach dangerous directives such as [env] _.source, templates, hooks, or tasks. The strongest current variant is trusted_config_paths = ["/"]. I confirmed on current v2026.3.17 in Docker that this causes an untrusted project config to become trusted …