CVE-2026-45375: SiYuan Bazaar marketplace renders unescaped package `name` and `version` metadata, allowing stored XSS and Electron code execution

SiYuan’s Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the name and version fields of a package’s plugin.json (and the equivalent theme.json / template.json / widget.json / icon.json) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper sanitizePackageDisplayStrings in kernel/bazaar/package.go HTML-escapes only Author, DisplayName, and Description — Name and Version flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at app/src/config/bazaar.ts substitutes them into HTML template strings via ${item.preferredName} / ${data.name} / v${data.version} and assigns the result to innerHTML. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.

Because the desktop client is built on Electron with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, and webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account. The trigger is zero-click on the list view — opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.

A second preferredName path exists: when displayName: {} (empty locale map), GetPreferredLocaleString falls back to the unescaped pkg.Name, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.