CVE-2026-125327: pgEdge RAG Server unbounded corpus read allows resource exhaustion from unauthenticated requests

An unauthenticated caller able to reach the query endpoint could exhaust database and server resources with ordinary, inexpensive requests.

The keyword-search arm read the entire corpus on every request and rebuilt an in-memory BM25 index from it, so the cost of serving a query scaled with the size of the source table rather than with the size of the result set. Each request cost the server and the tenant’s database far more than it cost the caller to make, which makes this a materially more effective denial-of-service lever than flooding the endpoint with ordinary requests. The amplification factor grows with corpus size, so the largest deployments are the most exposed.

Hybrid search was enabled by default and configured per pipeline rather than per request, so a caller could not opt out of the keyword arm and an operator could not leave it available to some requests but not others.

Who is affected: any deployment of pgEdge RAG Server at 1.0.0 or earlier, including all alpha and beta pre-releases, whose query endpoint is reachable by an untrusted party. The endpoint required no authentication and applied no rate limiting.

In 1.0.0, internal/database/search.go:130 built the corpus query with no LIMIT:

query = fmt.Sprintf(`
SELECT ...
FROM %s%s`,
tableIdent,
filterClause)

FetchDocuments accepted no limit parameter at all, so neither a caller nor the orchestrator had any way to bound the read. internal/config/loader.go:197 defaulted HybridEnabled to true, and internal/server/middleware.go:37 applied only logging, panic recovery and optional CORS.