Advisory Database
  • Advisories
  • Dependency Scanning
  1. golang
  2. ›
  3. github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend
  4. ›
  5. CVE-2026-50554

CVE-2026-50554: Note Mark: Unauthenticated disclosure of soft-deleted note metadata via deleted=true on public books

July 9, 2026

Summary

GET /api/books/{bookID}/notes is an unauthenticated endpoint that accepts a “deleted” query parameter. When the request is ?deleted=true, the service runs the query with Unscoped() (bypassing GORM’s soft-delete scope) but keeps the read-authorization clause as “owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?”. As a result, any unauthenticated caller can enumerate the metadata of soft-deleted (“trashed”) notes belonging to any public book — notes the owner explicitly deleted and expected to be removed from public view.

Affected component (code-verified)

backend/services/notes.go — GetNotesByBookID (lines 72-89):

func (s NotesService) GetNotesByBookID(currentUserID *uuid.UUID, bookID uuid.UUID, deleted bool) ([]db.Note, error) { tx := db.DB if deleted { tx = tx.Unscoped() // <– bypasses soft-delete scope } tx = tx. Preload(“Book”). Joins(“JOIN books ON books.id = notes.book_id”). Where( db.DB.Where(“books.id = ?”, bookID), db.DB.Where(“owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?”, currentUserID, true), // <– is_public still honored for trash ) if deleted { tx = tx.Where(“notes.deleted_at IS NOT NULL”) } var notes []db.Note return notes, dbErrorToServiceError(tx.Find(&notes).Error) }

Route registration confirms the endpoint has no AuthRequiredMiddleware (backend/handlers/notes.go:37), and the deleted flag is attacker-controlled (backend/handlers/notes.go:86 — Deleted bool with query:“deleted”).

Proof of concept

  1. A victim owns a public book (is_public = true), creates a note, then soft-deletes it (moves it to trash). The note still exists in the DB with deleted_at set.
  2. An unauthenticated attacker who knows (or enumerates) the book UUID requests: GET /api/books//notes?deleted=true
  3. The response lists the soft-deleted note(s) — id, title, slug, timestamps — even though the attacker is not authenticated and the owner intended the note to be deleted.

Impact

Exposure of soft-deleted note metadata (title, slug, timestamps) of public books to unauthenticated actors. The note body is not exposed — the content endpoint (GetNoteContent) does not use Unscoped(), so its count query returns 0 for soft-deleted notes and yields 404. Impact is therefore limited to metadata disclosure and the bypass of the intended “delete” semantics on public books.

Remediation

Restrict trash (soft-deleted) listings to the book owner only — never honor the is_public branch when deleted=true:

func (s NotesService) GetNotesByBookID(currentUserID *uuid.UUID, bookID uuid.UUID, deleted bool) ([]db.Note, error) { tx := db.DB if deleted { tx = tx.Unscoped() }

  • // Soft-deleted ("trash") notes must only ever be listed to the book owner.
    
  • authz := db.DB.Where("owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?", currentUserID, true)
    
  • if deleted {
    
  •         authz = db.DB.Where("owner_id = ?", currentUserID)
    
  • }
    

tx = tx. Preload(“Book”). Joins(“JOIN books ON books.id = notes.book_id”). Where( db.DB.Where(“books.id = ?”, bookID),

  •                 db.DB.Where("owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?", currentUserID, true),
    
  •                 authz,
    

) if deleted { tx = tx.Where(“notes.deleted_at IS NOT NULL”) } var notes []db.Note return notes, dbErrorToServiceError(tx.Find(&notes).Error) }

With this change, when currentUserID is nil (unauthenticated) and deleted=true, the clause becomes owner_id = NULL, which matches nothing — so trash is never exposed to anonymous callers.

Coordinated disclosure / CVE request

We have reported this privately and are happy to assist with any further validation or testing you need. If you agree this qualifies as a security vulnerability, we would be grateful if you could request a CVE ID for it — GitHub lets maintainers request a CVE directly from this advisory page once it is accepted. Thank you for your time and for maintaining note-mark.

References

  • CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-285: Improper Authorization
  • Prior note-mark authorization fix (CVE-2026-40265) established that read paths must scope by owner_id OR is_public; this report covers the trash path that the scope did not fully cover.

References

  • github.com/advisories/GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • github.com/enchant97/note-mark/commit/9c9b72740f22a06131a8f64b53bb08e3b05b81a6
  • github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50554

Code Behaviors & Features

Detect and mitigate CVE-2026-50554 with GitLab Dependency Scanning

Secure your software supply chain by verifying that all open source dependencies used in your projects contain no disclosed vulnerabilities. Learn more about Dependency Scanning →

Affected versions

All versions before 0.0.0-20260601210758-9c9b72740f22

Fixed versions

  • 0.0.0-20260601210758-9c9b72740f22

Solution

Upgrade to version 0.0.0-20260601210758-9c9b72740f22 or above.

Impact 5.3 MEDIUM

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Learn more about CVSS

Weakness

  • CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-285: Improper Authorization

Source file

go/github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend/CVE-2026-50554.yml

Spotted a mistake? Edit the file on GitLab.

  • Site Repo
  • About GitLab
  • Terms
  • Privacy Statement
  • Contact

Page generated Sat, 08 Aug 2026 00:19:01 +0000.