GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p: SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via graph and reference traversals
(updated )
A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (->) or back-reference (<~) traversal instead of a direct SELECT.
When a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE), a direct SELECT * FROM knows hid secret — but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects — person:bob->(SELECT * FROM knows), person:bob<~(SELECT * FROM comment), or a projected target vertex ->knows->(SELECT * FROM person) — returned it intact.
The root cause: the shared resolve_record_batch helper used by GraphEdgeScan (FullEdge) and ReferenceScan (FullRecord) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (build_field_state / filter_fields_by_permission) that ordinary table scans and fetch_record apply.
References
Code Behaviors & Features
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