A vulnerability in the xDS RBAC HTTP filter implementation in grpc-go allows remote attackers to bypass authorization policies (specifically DENY rules) by using mixed-case or canonical-case header matchers (e.g., X-Role instead of x-role). Additionally, the safety guards introduced by gRFC A41 to block grpc- prefixed headers can be evaded via variations in casing (e.g., Grpc-Status).
A vulnerability exists in gRPC-Go servers configured with xds.NewGRPCServer() where a crafted request missing both :authority and Host headers can cause a server panic, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). Servers built with xds.NewGRPCServer install an xDS routing interceptor on every RPC. This interceptor looks up the request’s :authority header to pick a virtual host. The HTTP/2 server transport previously accepted requests that had neither :authority nor Host. When …
TagReference.create() forwards a caller-influenced positional reference value into git tag without it ever being inspected by the unsafe-option guard, allowing an arbitrary file read (the file's contents are returned in-band as the annotated tag message). This is an incomplete-fix bypass of commit 3af0c251 (the fix for GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's tag instance).
Repo.blame() / Repo.blame_incremental() guard forwarded revision options against unsafe_git_revision_options, but that denylist only contains the file-WRITE options –output/-o. git blame also honors –contents <file> and -S <file>, which cause the file's lines to be echoed into the blame result — an arbitrary file READ. Neither option is in the denylist, so a caller-influenced revision value of –contents=<path> passes the guard and leaks file contents. This is a distinct sink-option and …
CWE: CWE-88 (Argument Injection) / CWE-94 (Code Injection) — via a read-then-corrupt-on-rewrite config round trip, not a direct setter argument Affected component: git/config.py — GitConfigParser._read() (multi-line value decoding, lines 444-541, esp. string_decode() at line 460 and its call sites at 519/541) and GitConfigParser._write()/write_section() (serialization, lines ~694-712, esp. line 708) Affected version: GitPython at HEAD (9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e, 2026-08-05, VERSION 3.1.58)
CWE: CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the "escapes intended base directory" sense) Affected component: git/repo/base.py, Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options (class attribute, lines 153-165) and Repo._clone() (lines 1477-1520), reached via the public Repo.clone_from() (line 1626) and Repo.clone() (line 1567) APIs. Affected version: GitPython at HEAD (9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e, 2026-08-05, VERSION 3.1.58)
Non-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first MissingSectionHeaderError), but that line very often is the secret — .env files (DATABASE_URL=…, API_KEY=…), single-line credential/token files, /etc/passwd's root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based …
Gitea's diffpatch endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content. An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository.
The isBlockedIP SSRF guard in Dozzle's webhook notification dispatcher blocks loopback, link-local, multicast, and unspecified addresses but does not recognize IPv6 transition mechanism addresses (RFC 3056 6to4, RFC 6052 NAT64, RFC 4380 Teredo) that embed arbitrary IPv4 addresses. An authenticated user can bypass the guard to reach loopback services, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and other blocked ranges via webhook notification URLs.
DeepSeek Harness before 0.1.2-alpha.1 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its local HTTP control-plane API that allows attackers to gain full agent control by supplying a spoofed Host header, as the server validates only the client-supplied Host header value rather than the actual TCP connection origin. Attackers can exploit this flaw to invoke privileged commands such as commands/execute with danger-full-access permissions, escalate session approval policies to unconfined execution, and retrieve …
If the p4 Perforce CLI client is installed, a malicious dependency package from a package repository allowing arbitrary perforce source URLs (packagist.org is safe) could execute arbitrary commands when running composer install or composer update. Composer passed a package's Perforce source address to the p4 CLI client without validating it. The p4 CLI client accepts addresses that mean "run this local command" instead of "connect to this server". This is …
colord's CSS color string matchers described a number as ([+-]?\d*.?\d+). In that form \d* and \d+ can match the same digits, so a run of n digits can be divided between them in O(n²) ways, and rejecting an input retries every division. Parsing is synchronous and uninterruptible, so a long malformed color string blocks the thread: | input | time to reject | | — | — | | 16 …
Custom mail headers added with Message::setHeaders() or addHeaders() do not have CRLF replaced allowing header injection if user controlled data is added to message headers without stripping CRLF bytes.
The FunctionsBuilder::jsonValue($field, $jsonPath) methods with the Postgres driver is vulnerable to SQL injection if user controlled data is supplied to the $jsonPath parameter.
The FunctionsBuilder::jsonValue($field, $jsonPath) methods with the Postgres driver is vulnerable to SQL injection if user controlled data is supplied to the $jsonPath parameter.
A vulnerability in libheif, used by the default Sharp image service in Astro, can lead to remote code execution when a malicious AVIF image is optimized. Projects are affected when an attacker can cause Astro to process an untrusted AVIF image. The fix was released in Astro 7.2.8, which requires Sharp 0.35.4.
Astro stripped a configured base path from request pathnames using a string-prefix check that did not verify a path-segment boundary. With base: "/app", a request to /appX/admin was treated as being under the base and resolved internally to the /admin route, while middleware still observed the public pathname /appX/admin. Middleware that authorizes routes by inspecting context.url.pathname could therefore be bypassed.
@sap/cds-mtxs NPM library does not perform sufficient checks on certain functionality used in multitenant CAP applications with extensibility enabled. An unauthenticated attacker could send specially crafted requests to obtain sensitive credentials and abuse them to replace or delete tenant data. Successful exploitation can result in a high impact on availability and integrity of the application. There may also be partial impact to the confidentiality of business data.
NLTK's Text.findall() and TokenSearcher.findall() methods accept user-supplied regular expressions and pass them to the Python re engine without timeout or validation, enabling catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS). This issue is isolated to the nltk.text module and was resolved in a prior commit.
The ftp and scp tasks of Apache Ant can download files from a remote server. A malicious server can provide relative paths that allow it to write outside of the dedicated target directory for the download, making it possible to overwrite files of the attacker's choice using the permissions of the user running Ant in versions prior to Ant 1.10.18. In order to exploit this vulnerability, the server would either …
When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic RequestValidationError. The validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts this exception to a string via str(exc), which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing sanitize_message() function in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py strips memory addresses (e.g., 0x7f…) but does not strip File "…", line X patterns. The result is a user-facing …
The fix for GHSA-rwxx-mrjm-wc2m ("ReDoS via structured_outputs.regex compiled without timeout") wrapped the regex compile in the xgrammar and outlines backends with compile_regex_with_timeout (and, for outlines, validate_regex_is_buildable). The lm-format-enforcer backend was left unguarded: it compiles the attacker-supplied regex with no timeout and no buildability check. A single request with a catastrophic regex hangs the structured-output compile step and stalls the engine worker (denial of service).
The /v1/completions/derender and /v1/chat/completions/derender endpoints accept caller-supplied GenerateResponse objects and postprocess every nested choices[*].token_ids list directly. Unlike the normal render/generate path, derender does not enforce model context length, resolved max_tokens, max_num_seqs, choice-count, or response-size bounds before detokenizing and returning the supplied token IDs. An authenticated API client can therefore make the CPU-only render frontend, or any server exposing these /v1 derender routes, spend CPU and memory proportional to attacker-chosen generated-output-shaped …
@typespec/spector registers a POST /.admin/stop HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server's port—not just localhost—making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is High …
A PERMISSIONS … WHERE clause is evaluated with permission enforcement disabled, so it can't recurse into its own checks. But the clause could also contain data-modifying statements, and these ran with enforcement still off — so evaluating a permission check could write to tables the caller cannot write. For example: DEFINE TABLE post PERMISSIONS FOR update WHERE (CREATE log SET at = time::now()) OR true; Any user allowed to update …
An authenticated user scoped to one namespace/database could invoke a custom API (DEFINE API) belonging to a different namespace/database, reaching another tenant's endpoint. The route /api/{namespace}/{database}/{endpoint} took the namespace and database from the URL and applied them to the caller's session before the endpoint was looked up or run, without checking that the caller's authenticated scope covered them. Because a custom API handler runs with permissions disabled (definer's rights), the …
SurrealDB offers http functions that can access external network endpoints. A typical, albeit not recommended configuration would be to start SurrealDB with all network connections allowed with the exception of a deny list. For example, surreal start –allow-net –deny-net 10.0.0.0/8 will allow all network connections except to the 10.0.0.0/8 block. An authenticated user of SurrealDB can use bypass this restriction, using http::<fn>(<url>) functions where the hostname resolves to an IP …
/api/system/getConf returns Conf.CookieKey, the key used to sign the server's session cookies in its response body. The endpoint is registered with CheckAuth only, so the field reaches the publish RoleReader token and the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. The configuration-export endpoint in the same file strips this exact field before returning config, so the project already treats it as secret. The reader-facing masking path does not.
/api/tag/getTag filters its results for reader roles through FilterTagsByPublishIgnore, which checks only the visible publish tier. Documents that are published but password-protected pass that check, so a reader who has never entered a document's publish password receives every tag label used inside it, together with occurrence counts. The project has already treated this exact tier mismatch as a vulnerability on a sibling path: commit 82e9ded42 ("Enforce publish access for graph …
Several static-file routes in the server mux (kernel/server/serve.go) are registered with CheckAuth only and serve directories directly, without the publish-access checks, sensitive-path blocklist, or refuseToAccess rules that the REST API applies to the same data. They are therefore reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Most notably, /templates/ serves data/templates a directory the REST file API explicitly refuses to serve to non-administrators.
renderAttributeView correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter's row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row's first cell, and it never inspects the remaining cells' values. Relation and Rollup cells carry mirrored content from a different database, so a row belonging to a published database can hand an anonymous reader the contents of a related database whose host document is hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected. Separately, when the first …
/api/system/getConf is registered with CheckAuth only and is reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and anonymously when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers: | Field | JSON | What it is | Cleared by exportConf at | |—|—|—|—| | Conf.CookieKey …
Five filetree endpoints resolve arbitrary document IDs and paths with no publish-access check of any kind. All are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader can map the complete private document tree every notebook, folder, and document title, and which notebook holds each document for documents marked hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden, and can resolve titles …
POST /api/notebook/getEncryptedNotebookStatus returns the identifier, name, and current lock state of every encrypted notebook, with no publish-access filtering. The route is registered CheckAuth only, no CheckReadonly, no CheckAdminRole so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Encrypted notebooks are private by design; their names frequently reveal the sensitive topic that motivated encrypting them.
/api/block/getBlockDOMWithEmbed and /api/block/getBlockDOMsWithEmbed gate only the requested block against publish access. The blocks pulled in by that block's embed (transclusion) query are inlined into the returned DOM with no publish-access check at all, so a reader who requests a legitimately-published block containing an embed query receives the content of every block that query matched including blocks in hidden, forbidden and password-protected documents. The dedicated embed endpoint getEmbedBlock filters these same …
validateCertificatePath() does not verify that an attestation's certificate chain actually terminates at a configured trust anchor. When walking the chain it stops at the first self-signed certificate it finds (which could be user-supplied), and exits early. This happens before the configured Apple/Google/etc trust anchor (which is concatenated to the end of the chain) is reached. A user can therefore register a credential and have the server accept it as if …
The OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (/api/proxy/, /api/exec/, /api/wirelogs/) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as "read-only," the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal …
DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic.
DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic.
DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic.
DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic.
The rlm_eval tool runs an arbitrary Python string chosen by the model in a real python3 interpreter. Its approval_requirement() returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, which the engine treats as "never prompt," regardless of the user's configured –approval-policy. A single tool call — which prompt injection from any untrusted content the agent reads (a web page, a fetched URL, a repo file, an MCP tool result) can induce — runs code on the user's …
The rlm_eval tool runs an arbitrary Python string chosen by the model in a real python3 interpreter. Its approval_requirement() returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, which the engine treats as "never prompt," regardless of the user's configured –approval-policy. A single tool call — which prompt injection from any untrusted content the agent reads (a web page, a fetched URL, a repo file, an MCP tool result) can induce — runs code on the user's …
The rlm_eval tool runs an arbitrary Python string chosen by the model in a real python3 interpreter. Its approval_requirement() returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, which the engine treats as "never prompt," regardless of the user's configured –approval-policy. A single tool call — which prompt injection from any untrusted content the agent reads (a web page, a fetched URL, a repo file, an MCP tool result) can induce — runs code on the user's …
The rlm_eval tool runs an arbitrary Python string chosen by the model in a real python3 interpreter. Its approval_requirement() returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, which the engine treats as "never prompt," regardless of the user's configured –approval-policy. A single tool call — which prompt injection from any untrusted content the agent reads (a web page, a fetched URL, a repo file, an MCP tool result) can induce — runs code on the user's …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can set instructions to an array of arbitrary file paths (including paths outside the workspace like ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.aws/credentials) that are read from disk and injected into the AI model's system prompt. There is no path validation, workspace boundary check, or tightening guard on the instructions field. This enables a malicious repository to exfiltrate the contents of sensitive files on the …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can set instructions to an array of arbitrary file paths (including paths outside the workspace like ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.aws/credentials) that are read from disk and injected into the AI model's system prompt. There is no path validation, workspace boundary check, or tightening guard on the instructions field. This enables a malicious repository to exfiltrate the contents of sensitive files on the …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can set instructions to an array of arbitrary file paths (including paths outside the workspace like ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.aws/credentials) that are read from disk and injected into the AI model's system prompt. There is no path validation, workspace boundary check, or tightening guard on the instructions field. This enables a malicious repository to exfiltrate the contents of sensitive files on the …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can set instructions to an array of arbitrary file paths (including paths outside the workspace like ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.aws/credentials) that are read from disk and injected into the AI model's system prompt. There is no path validation, workspace boundary check, or tightening guard on the instructions field. This enables a malicious repository to exfiltrate the contents of sensitive files on the …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can silently set allow_shell = true for any user who clones and opens the repository in CodeWhale. This enables the AI model's exec_shell tool, granting arbitrary shell command execution on the victim's machine without the user's explicit opt-in. The approval_policy and sandbox_mode fields correctly enforce tightening-only semantics from project config, but allow_shell has no such guard, contradicting the intent of GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can silently set allow_shell = true for any user who clones and opens the repository in CodeWhale. This enables the AI model's exec_shell tool, granting arbitrary shell command execution on the victim's machine without the user's explicit opt-in. The approval_policy and sandbox_mode fields correctly enforce tightening-only semantics from project config, but allow_shell has no such guard, contradicting the intent of GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can silently set allow_shell = true for any user who clones and opens the repository in CodeWhale. This enables the AI model's exec_shell tool, granting arbitrary shell command execution on the victim's machine without the user's explicit opt-in. The approval_policy and sandbox_mode fields correctly enforce tightening-only semantics from project config, but allow_shell has no such guard, contradicting the intent of GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 …
A malicious .codewhale/config.toml or .deepseek/config.toml committed to a repository can silently set allow_shell = true for any user who clones and opens the repository in CodeWhale. This enables the AI model's exec_shell tool, granting arbitrary shell command execution on the victim's machine without the user's explicit opt-in. The approval_policy and sandbox_mode fields correctly enforce tightening-only semantics from project config, but allow_shell has no such guard, contradicting the intent of GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 …
js_execution exposes parent process environment to model-provided JavaScript The js_execution tool spawns Node with tokio::process::Command::new without calling the child_env scrubber that exec_shell, the Python REPL, and the MCP launcher all use. Model-provided JavaScript reads process.env and the values flow back to the parent transcript as the tool's stdout, exposing API keys, cloud credentials, and forge tokens to the next model turn.
js_execution exposes parent process environment to model-provided JavaScript The js_execution tool spawns Node with tokio::process::Command::new without calling the child_env scrubber that exec_shell, the Python REPL, and the MCP launcher all use. Model-provided JavaScript reads process.env and the values flow back to the parent transcript as the tool's stdout, exposing API keys, cloud credentials, and forge tokens to the next model turn.
js_execution exposes parent process environment to model-provided JavaScript The js_execution tool spawns Node with tokio::process::Command::new without calling the child_env scrubber that exec_shell, the Python REPL, and the MCP launcher all use. Model-provided JavaScript reads process.env and the values flow back to the parent transcript as the tool's stdout, exposing API keys, cloud credentials, and forge tokens to the next model turn.
js_execution exposes parent process environment to model-provided JavaScript The js_execution tool spawns Node with tokio::process::Command::new without calling the child_env scrubber that exec_shell, the Python REPL, and the MCP launcher all use. Model-provided JavaScript reads process.env and the values flow back to the parent transcript as the tool's stdout, exposing API keys, cloud credentials, and forge tokens to the next model turn.
image_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint The image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly …
image_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint The image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly …
image_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint The image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly …
image_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint The image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly …
exec_shell is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling exec_shell_interact returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a python3 -i REPL, mysql, ssh, sudo -i, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, "stdin" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then …
exec_shell is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling exec_shell_interact returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a python3 -i REPL, mysql, ssh, sudo -i, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, "stdin" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then …
exec_shell is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling exec_shell_interact returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a python3 -i REPL, mysql, ssh, sudo -i, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, "stdin" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then …
exec_shell is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling exec_shell_interact returns ApprovalRequirement::Auto, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a python3 -i REPL, mysql, ssh, sudo -i, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, "stdin" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then …
A malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded AGENTS.md is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI. Useful targets reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile ~/.gitconfig (chainable into RCE via core.editor) ~/.config/**, ~/.aws/credentials, project source files The written content is the git show rendering of HEAD commit …
A malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded AGENTS.md is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI. Useful targets reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile ~/.gitconfig (chainable into RCE via core.editor) ~/.config/**, ~/.aws/credentials, project source files The written content is the git show rendering of HEAD commit …
A malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded AGENTS.md is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI. Useful targets reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile ~/.gitconfig (chainable into RCE via core.editor) ~/.config/**, ~/.aws/credentials, project source files The written content is the git show rendering of HEAD commit …
A malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded AGENTS.md is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI. Useful targets reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile ~/.gitconfig (chainable into RCE via core.editor) ~/.config/**, ~/.aws/credentials, project source files The written content is the git show rendering of HEAD commit …
Arbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311). Reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and other private keys ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.netrc .env files anywhere in the filesystem Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to The leaked contents land in the model's context. The same model that …
Arbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311). Reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and other private keys ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.netrc .env files anywhere in the filesystem Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to The leaked contents land in the model's context. The same model that …
Arbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311). Reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and other private keys ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.netrc .env files anywhere in the filesystem Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to The leaked contents land in the model's context. The same model that …
Arbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311). Reachable as the invoking user: ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and other private keys ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.netrc .env files anywhere in the filesystem Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to The leaked contents land in the model's context. The same model that …
The follow-up protection for CVE-2025-62164 is incomplete at vLLM revision 26587f9519e22a5c4549ead7595ad9ca3229c4fd. It wraps serialized prompt-embedding reconstruction and dense conversion in torch.sparse.check_sparse_tensor_invariants(), but PyTorch 2.11.0 implements that context with save/enable/restore operations over process-global state. Two prompt-embedding parts in one /v1/chat/completions request are gathered concurrently on the event loop's default executor. When one context exits before the other loads its tensor, it can restore the global flag to False while the second …
The VictoriaMetrics vmrestore utility does not validate backup part path components before writing restored files to the local filesystem. An attacker who can provide or modify a backup source can craft object names containing .. path components that cause vmrestore to write files outside the intended -storageDataPath restore root, subject to the permissions of the vmrestore process.
Server-Side Request Forgery in unstructured. The url= argument of partition(), partition_html(), and partition_md() is fetched via requests.get() with no host validation. The response body is returned as Element text, so this is a full-read SSRF — attackers reach loopback admin APIs, internal HTTP services, and cloud metadata endpoints, and read the response. unstructured is the de facto URL ingestion layer for LangChain UnstructuredURLLoader, LlamaIndex UnstructuredReader, Chainlit, and many agent frameworks …
Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a proto, constructor, or prototype key wrote through the object's prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting Object.prototype for the whole runtime. The expandPaths: 'safe' path (dotted keys such as a.proto.x) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own proto properties and could fire an inherited setter …
toml.parse() crashes with an uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded when parsing deeply nested arrays or inline tables. The parser is generated by Peggy 5.1.0 (a PEG parser generator) as a recursive-descent parser; the value rule mutually recurses with the array and inline-table rules with no depth limit, so nesting depth equal to the input depth exhausts Node's call stack. A small payload — a bare array nested a …
toml.parse() writes attacker-controlled keys onto Object.prototype. The compiler protects the tables it builds by creating them with Object.create(null), which neutralizes a direct [proto] table. An attacker bypasses that protection by routing a table path through a scalar value and into the real prototype chain: a path such as a.b.y.proto.proto, where a.b.y holds a number, resolves to Object.prototype and every subsequent key/value writes onto it. The bypass succeeds because the compiler's …
The path filters pick, ignore, filter, and replace — the library's headline "surgical extraction" feature — recompute the full path string from the nesting stack on every checkable token. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth, and a checkable token is emitted at every level, processing a document of depth D costs O(D²), not O(D). This is triggered by document structure (nesting depth), not byte volume, so a …
The /api/search/fullTextSearchAssetContent endpoint exposes two SQL flaws on the asset-content database, both reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false: method 2 passes a client-supplied SQL statement to the read-write asset-content DB with no single-statement or read-only guard, and without the admin restriction its sibling fullTextSearchBlock applies to the same SQL method. method 3 builds a REGEXP clause by concatenating the client expression …
The /api/search/searchEmbedBlock endpoint passes a client-supplied SQL statement verbatim to the database with no validation. The endpoint is gated by CheckAuth only reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. The statement runs on the main read-write siyuan.db handle through a driver that executes stacked statements, with no single-statement or read-only guard. An unauthenticated request can therefore execute arbitrary SQL reading and writing …
SiYuan cleans user supplied SVG with util.SanitizeSVG before it serves the file inline as image/svg+xml. This cleaner is the guard behind the Editor.AllowSVGScript setting, which is off by default, so a <script> inside an SVG is meant to be removed. The cleaner reads the input as HTML, but the browser reads the served file as XML (SVG). Because the two parsers treat some tags differently, a <script> can be hidden …
The backlink/mention search query (kernel/model/backlink.go) concatenates stored block metadata (title, name, alias, anchor text) and the client-supplied keyword into a SQL MATCH/search statement, escaping only the double-quote character (") and not the single quote ('). A single quote in either the client keyword or in stored document metadata breaks out of the string literal. The query runs on the main read-write siyuan.db handle through a statement-stacking-capable driver. This yields two …
Attribute-view (AV) template columns are live-evaluated on every render and expose the queryBlocks template function, which runs raw SQL on the read-write database handle (SelectBlocksRawStmt, using ?→argument string substitution rather than parameter binding). AV mutations are admin-gated, so this is not directly reader-injectable but it is a second-order vector: an attacker distributes a SiYuan document or AV package whose template column contains .action{queryBlocks "<arbitrary SQL>"} when a victim imports the …
WebSocket sessions established through the publish surface (port 6808, RoleReader anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false) are added to the same broadcast session pool as authenticated sessions. The kernel's broadcast functions push content events transactions carrying block DOM, document save/create, move/rename to every session in the pool with no role or publish-access filtering. As a result, an anonymous reader who holds a WebSocket connection open passively receives a real-time feed of …
Four attribute-view read endpoints build a filesystem path from a caller-controlled id/avID and read it without confining the result to the attribute-view storage directory (DataDir/storage/av/). On the load (file-exists) code path there is no boundary check, so an avID containing ../ segments escapes storage/av/ and causes the kernel to read a .json file elsewhere in the workspace. The endpoints require only CheckAuth, which the publish service's RoleReader token satisfies; when …
SiYuan's /export/ file handler was hardened against export disclosure (issue #12213) by adding an IsSubPath(exportBaseDir, fullPath) check and an IsSensitivePath() check in commit bb481e1. These guards were added only to the main branch of the handler. The handler begins with a short-circuit branch: if strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/export/temp/") { c.File(filepath.Join(util.TempDir, c.Request.URL.Path)) return } This branch joins the broader util.TempDir with the raw, percent-decoded request path and serves it with neither IsSubPath nor …
FilterViewByPublishAccess, the filter renderAttributeView applies for Reader sessions drops rows using only the hidden/forbidden check and never checks the publish password. Its three sibling filters all check both tiers. As a result, a publish RoleReader (or the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false) who has not entered a document's password still receives every database/attribute-view row bound to that password-protected document, the primary cell (title/ID) and all column values.
The /api/asset/getFileAnnotation endpoint returns the content of .sya PDF-annotation files with no publish-access check. It is gated by CheckAuth only, so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Its sibling, the /assets/* asset route does enforce publish access, including the publish password. An anonymous reader who knows an asset path can therefore read the private PDF annotations (highlights, notes) attached …
POST /api/attr/getBlockAttrs and POST /api/attr/batchGetBlockAttrs return a block's full attribute set (IAL) with no publish-access check. Both are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader supplying a block ID receives the block's name, alias, memo, bookmark, tags, and every custom-* attribute including for blocks in publish-forbidden and password-protected documents. The batch variant accepts an ID …
POST /api/av/getAttributeViewKeysByID returns a database's full column schema with no publish-access filtering, while its sibling getAttributeViewKeys applies the filter for reader sessions. Two further endpoints, getBlockDefIDsByRefText and getBlockRelevantIDs return workspace-wide block IDs with no publish scoping. All three are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
Three block endpoints return document content snippets and metadata without any publish-access check, while their sibling getBlockInfo which returns comparable data does enforce one. All three are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader supplying a block ID receives content and metadata belonging to publish-forbidden and password-protected documents.
The /api/ref/refreshBacklink endpoint is gated by CheckAuth only. Unlike its mutating siblings, it carries no CheckAdminRole, no CheckReadonly, and no inline reader-role guard so it falls through all three authorization mechanisms the codebase uses to protect write operations. A publish RoleReader or the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false can invoke it, forcing the server to flush its pending write-transaction queue, scan all references globally, load and parse referencing trees …
The kernel's CheckAuth grants RoleAdministrator to any request whose RemoteAddr is loopback (127.0.0.1), for a specific set of endpoints, and these localhost bypasses sit outside the accessAuthCode gate so they apply even when an access auth code is configured. This is demonstrated live (Part A below). Separately, the fixed-port reverse proxy (fixedport.go) forwards requests to the kernel over loopback and injects no authentication token, and no SetTrustedProxies is configured, so …
getGraph and getLocalGraph filter reader sessions against the visibility tier only and never check the publish password. Password-protected documents are Visible = true, so their graph nodes survive the filter and graph nodes are block-level and carry the block's actual content. An anonymous reader who has never supplied a document's password can therefore retrieve that document's per-block content and its reference/backlink topology. Both endpoints are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable …
Three "heading transaction" endpoints /api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction, /api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction, and /api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction return the rendered block DOM of a heading and its subtree in the computed transaction payload, with no publish-access check. They are gated by CheckAuth only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Despite their write-implying names, these endpoints perform no mutation on this path, they compute a transaction object and …
Two CheckAuth-only endpoints disclose the complete offline attack material for the encrypted-notebook master password, plus the wrapped per-notebook key needed to use it. Both are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An unauthenticated remote client can retrieve the Argon2id salt and cost parameters, a verifier that confirms a correct password offline, and the encrypted per-notebook data key reducing the security of …
The /api/block/getBlockInfo endpoint returns document root metadata including the document title (rootTitle) for a block in a publish-forbidden document, with no publish-access check. Its sibling /api/block/getDocInfo applies the publish-access filter, getBlockInfo does not. Both are gated by CheckAuth only, so getBlockInfo is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
The backlink API splits into list endpoints (which documents reference a block) and content endpoints (the rendered text of those referencing blocks). The list endpoints apply a publish-access filter, the content endpoints do not. As a result, /api/ref/getBacklinkDoc and /api/ref/getBackmentionDoc return the rendered DOM of blocks belonging to a publish-forbidden document to an anonymous reader, with no access check. Both content endpoints are gated by CheckAuth only, reachable by the …
SiYuan's publish mode defines a "protected" access level: a document that is publicly listed but requires a password to read (per the product's own UI help text, protected = "Publicly visible, requires password to access"). The password is enforced on the primary content path (getDoc, via FilterContentByPublishAccess). Several other content-returning endpoints getHeadingChildrenDOM, getHeadingDeleteTransaction/getHeadingLevelTransaction/ getHeadingInsertTransaction, and getBacklinkDoc/getBackmentionDoc return rendered block DOM with no password check at all. Combined with reader-reachable endpoints …
POST /api/asset/resolveAssetPath returns the resolved absolute filesystem path of an asset, unmodified. The route is CheckAuth-only, so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader who knows any asset's relative path trivially harvested from an <img src="assets/…"> in any published document receives the server's absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and the installation layout.
Semaphore resolves a project member's effective permissions in ProjectMiddleware by looking up a role row whose slug matches the member's assigned role, and overwrites the built-in permission bitmask with that row's value. A member holding the built-in manager role creates a custom project role through POST /api/project/{id}/roles, a route gated only by the CanManageProjectResources permission that manager already holds. The role-creation validator does not reserve the built-in slug names (owner, …
The password change form is vulnerable to CSRF, allowing an attacker to change a user password (even the administrator) by tricking a connected user to visit a malicious website. The vulnerability has been tested with version 2.18.20.
rubyzip versions before 3.4.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in Zip::Entry#extract that fails to properly validate extraction paths using prefix comparison without trailing separators. Attackers can craft archive entries with names like ../upload_backup/owned.sh to write files outside the intended extraction directory into sibling paths sharing the destination prefix.
python-jose through 3.5.0 fails to properly validate asymmetric keys in HMAC initialization, accepting DER-encoded public keys that lack PEM armor or SSH prefixes. Attackers holding the service's public key can forge HS256 tokens that pass verification when algorithms are not explicitly restricted. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-33663.
The Phoenix JavaScript presence client (assets/js/phoenix/presence.js) tests whether a presence already exists using a bare truthiness check (state[key]) rather than an own-property check. Because applications commonly track presences under a client-supplied username or id, the presence key can be attacker-controlled. A user who joins a channel and picks a key that names an Object.prototype member (proto, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes the lookup return the inherited Object.prototype object instead …
When Orval is configured with output.baseUrl.getBaseUrlFromSpecification: true, it bakes the spec's servers[0].url into the generated request URL as a template literal without escaping the backtick. A server URL containing a backtick closes the template literal and injects a concatenation expression evaluated when the generated URL/request function is called, executing attacker-controlled code. Verified on Orval 8.19.0 (fetch client); survives default OpenAPI validation.
orval, when generating MSW mocks (output.mock: true), emits each schema property name as a single-quoted object key in the mock factory WITHOUT escaping the single quote. A ' in a property name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when the mock factory is called (e.g. in tests / MSW handlers) -> RCE. The property name is a pure data …
Orval emits the OpenAPI path into the generated request URL as a TEMPLATE LITERAL (/users/...) without escaping the backtick character. A path containing a backtick closes the template literal and injects a concatenation expression that is evaluated when the generated URL/request/key function is called, executing attacker-controlled code. Affects the axios, fetch, react-query, and swr clients. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives Orval's default OpenAPI validation.
Orval's zod schema generation emits a schema's default value as a module-level template literal (export const …Default = ;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression that is evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
orval's zod client emits each query parameter name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({…}) request-validation schema WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A " in the query parameter name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({…}) runs – at MODULE IMPORT (export const OpQueryParams = zod.object({…}) executes on load) -> import-time RCE. The query parameter name is …
Orval's zod schema generation emits the header-parameter default value as a module-level template literal (export const Default = ;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
orval's zod client emits each header parameter name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({…}) request-validation schema WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A " in the header parameter name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({…}) runs – at MODULE IMPORT (export const OpHeader = zod.object({…}) executes on load) -> import-time RCE. The header parameter name is …
Orval's zod schema generation emits the enum-typed default value as a module-level template literal (export const …Default = ;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
Orval's zod schema generation emits the array-items default value as a module-level template literal (export const …Default = ;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
Alist's offline-download feature (POST /api/fs/add_offline_download with tool: "SimpleHttp") accepts an attacker-supplied URL, fetches it, and saves the bytes under a per-task temp directory before transferring to the user's destination storage. The temp filename is taken from the response's Content-Disposition header (attacker-controlled when the URL points to an attacker HTTP server), passed verbatim to filepath.Join(tempDir, filename), and written via os.Create with no containment check. Go's filepath.Join calls Clean on the result, …
Feishu tools could ignore per-account disablement. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could perform actions that should have required a stronger authorization or policy check. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Feishu permission tools could ignore per-account disablement. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could perform actions that should have required a stronger authorization or policy check. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is …
node-forge through 1.4.0 fails to validate element count in nested DigestAlgorithm sequences during RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Attackers can embed garbage bytes inside the DigestAlgorithm sequence to forge valid signatures for arbitrary messages using low-exponent RSA keys. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33894.
Material for MkDocs 7.2.0 through 9.7.6 contains a DOM-based cross-site scripting vulnerability in the optional search.suggest feature. A crafted q URL parameter could execute JavaScript in the documentation site's origin after user interaction.
The current implementation of strip_html can cause an infinite loop when the input string contains <, has at least one character before <, and no > appears after <.
A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.
A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.
npx claude-code-templates –studio launches "Claude Code Studio", an Express HTTP server (cli-tool/src/sandbox-server.js, default port 3444) that binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0), sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, and requires no authentication. Two POST endpoints pass attacker-controlled request-body fields into child_process.spawn(…, { shell: true }). Because shell: true makes Node join the argv array into a single sh -c string, the fields are parsed by the shell and metacharacters execute. Any unauthenticated attacker who …
Error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF'd to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments).
The response cache derives its key from an ambiguous string serialization of the request parameters. canonicalizeParams joins sorted ${key}=${value} pairs with & and does not escape &, =, or the | field separators used in buildCacheKey. Two different logical parameter sets can therefore serialize to the same key and share one cache entry. Because the cached value is whatever the upstream returned for whichever request populated the entry first, an …
Standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy specifications using CIDR-based ipBlock rules without pod or namespace selectors erroneously generate a wildcard namespace allow rule under specific cluster configurations. When Cilium deployment is configured with a specific custom clusterName (rather than the default "any" value), the parser incorrectly instantiates a pod selector on selectorless peer definitions. This leads to Cilium appending an unintended wildcard namespace label selector to the policy's allowed Layer 3 rules, which …
A mutation-XSS / allowedTags bypass: when textarea (or xmp) is included in allowedTags, an input containing a literal </textarea/> (a solidus right after the RCDATA end-tag name) lets non-allowed markup such as <img src=x onerror=…> pass through sanitizeHtml() live and unescaped, even though img/onerror are not in the allowlist. A spec-compliant browser executes the surviving handler — XSS. This is a literal-solidus variant that bypasses the two most recent fixes …
ApostropheCMS enforces per-type authorization on pages: a page type may declare editRole / publishRole (and the core @apostrophecms/archive-page does), so a project can have page-type subtrees that only higher-privileged roles are allowed to create or edit within. The move() operation is supposed to enforce that a page may only be moved into a parent the actor has create rights over — this is the same boundary the page-insert route enforces …
Summary A vulnerability exists in the amqp091-go client library where a compromised or malicious AMQP broker can force the client to allocate resources for and process content body frames that exceed the negotiated frame_max limit. This can lead to unexpected memory consumption or application-layer denial of service (DoS), bypassing the protocol's built-in framing constraints. Details During a standard AMQP 0-9-1 connection handshake, the client and the broker negotiate a maximum …
An EntityReference node can be created with an invalid, attacker-controlled name through Document.createEntityReference(name). When this node is serialized directly with: serializer.serializeToString(ref, { requireWellFormed: true }) the invalid nodeName is emitted into the serialized XML fragment without validation or escaping. This can produce real XML markup in the serialized output. In the proof of concept below, the serialized fragment contains <injected/>, and reparsing the fragment creates a real injected element.
An EntityReference node can be created with an invalid, attacker-controlled name through Document.createEntityReference(name). When this node is serialized directly with: serializer.serializeToString(ref, { requireWellFormed: true }) the invalid nodeName is emitted into the serialized XML fragment without validation or escaping. This can produce real XML markup in the serialized output. In the proof of concept below, the serialized fragment contains <injected/>, and reparsing the fragment creates a real injected element.
@tiptap/core's public mergeAttributes() helper uses ordinary bracket assignment on keys returned by Object.entries(). An own proto key from JSON therefore invokes the legacy prototype setter on the fresh merged object. The function returns an object whose prototype is attacker-controlled, while Object.keys() and ordinary own-property checks show no attacker attributes. When that result is used as a ProseMirror DOMOutputSpec attribute object, prosemirror-model's DOMSerializer.renderSpec() enumerates it with for…in and applies inherited values …
Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in the media download endpoint. The download route (/media/{id}/download/{slug} and its admin variant) accepts the query parameter ?inline=1. When it is present, the response is sent with the header Content-Disposition: inline for any MIME type, which overrides the disposition rules the server would otherwise apply. By default, HTML and other scriptable uploads are not blocked, the file is served on the application origin with its …
A media move authorization bypass (IDOR) lets a backend user move a media out of a collection they have no access to. The media move endpoint resolves its permission check from the collection value in the request rather than from the media's real collection. MediaManager::move() then reassigns the media without re-checking its actual source collection. A user who has edit rights on collection A but no rights on a restricted …
A missing authorization check on the preview link endpoint lets a backend user create a public, unauthenticated preview URL for content they are not allowed to see. PreviewLinkController (and the underlying PreviewLinkManager::generate() / revoke()) never enforced a permission on the target resource. Any authenticated administration user could call the generate action for any page, article or snippet, including content in a webspace or area they have no VIEW rights on. …
Siyuan's block search endpoint concatenates attacker-controlled paths[] values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes. Through Siyuan's publish service, an unauthenticated visitor is forwarded to the kernel with a reader-role token and can reach POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock. An attacker can inject a UNION SELECT through paths[] and return rows from hidden documents while projecting an allowed visible box and path. The post-query publish access filter trusts the projected box and …
Reporter: Cavan Loughran, Celvex Group Inc. Summary The /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go performs a bare filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) on the single-decoded c.Request.URL.Path and serves the result with c.File(), with NO IsSubPath containment and NO IsSensitivePath denylist - unlike the sibling /export/ (serveExport) and /appearance/ (serveAppearance) handlers, which both carry IsSubPath, and unlike /assets/ (serveAssets), whose traversal was fixed in GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664. Because util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets, an authenticated request to GET …
The filer registered the IAM gRPC service (SeaweedIdentityAccessManagement) with no authentication. Any client able to reach the filer gRPC port could invoke IAM RPCs — CreateUser, CreateAccessKey, PutUserPolicy, and related calls — to mint credentials and grant itself S3 administrative privileges. This fully compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of stored objects. No credentials are required, and enabling the documented JWT signing keys does not close it: the IAM gRPC …
When a filer JWT restricts a token to a set of path prefixes via allowed_prefixes, the authorization check used a literal byte-prefix match (strings.HasPrefix). A token scoped to /tenant1 therefore also authorized requests to sibling paths such as /tenant1234, /tenant1-old, and /tenant1backup. In a multi-tenant deployment this lets the holder of one tenant's token access another tenant's data. Because allowed_prefixes gates both read and write tokens, the impact covers cross-tenant …
Users making Scrapy s3:// requests with AWS credentials are impacted. A network attacker able to observe traffic between Scrapy and S3, such as a public Wi-Fi attacker, compromised router, ISP/corporate network observer, or local network attacker using ARP spoofing, can read: bucket/key path AWS Authorization header X-Amz-Security-Token, if temporary credentials are used S3 object contents S3 response headers An active MITM attacker can also modify the plaintext S3 response body, …
qs.stringify() calls utils.isBuffer() on every value it serializes, and utils.isBuffer() invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj) without checking that it is callable. A value whose own constructor.isBuffer is a non-function makes qs call a non-callable and throw TypeError. Such a value is produced by qs.parse itself from an untrusted query string when plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true is set, so a pure-qs parse → stringify round-trip — no JSON.parse — turns an unauthenticated query …
qs v6.15.3 allows bracket-key input to bypass arrayLimit and throwOnLimitExceeded when comma: true. The input a[]=1,2,3,4 succeeds with arrayLimit: 3, while the equivalent plain-key input is rejected. Affected version tested: qs v6.15.3 commit 18d085e919dae70c8f1b200ab99323058edab2c2
An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires a call to read_until_whitespace with an input which does not have whitespace for a long time.
The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the safeJoinModulesDir containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and symlinkDependency but NOT to …
When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs …
@platejs/docx-io can fetch remote image URLs while converting HTML to DOCX. When an application converts attacker-controlled HTML in a server-side or privileged environment, this can cause the application environment to make unintended outbound requests and include fetched image data in the generated DOCX.
orval's zod client emits each schema property name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({…}) WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A " in a property name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({…}) runs – which is at MODULE IMPORT (the export const X = zod.object({…}) executes on load) -> import-time RCE. The property name is a …
Orval's zod schema generation emits the query-parameter default value as a module-level template literal (export const …Default = ;) without escaping ${ or the backtick. A default of the form v${<code>}w injects a live JavaScript expression evaluated when the generated zod schema module is imported, executing attacker-controlled code at import — no request or function call needed. Verified on Orval 8.19.0; survives default OpenAPI validation.
Orval resolves OpenAPI $refs by fetching remote http(s) URLs and reading local files (including absolute / out-of-tree paths), inlining the referenced schema into the generated client. Running orval on a spec whose $ref points at an attacker/internal URL or an arbitrary local file yields SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion. Verified on 8.19.0. This is a different class from Orval's published output-injection CVEs (CVE-2026-22785/23947/24132/25141), none of which covers …
The OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the X-Event-Key header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without …
The OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway served its caller-facing management APIs on the same network listener that accepts data-plane agent connections. In the multi-cluster topology that listener is published outside the cluster, and the management APIs did not authenticate the calling client. A party able to reach the listener could therefore invoke privileged data-plane operations without authenticating and without passing through the OpenChoreo API server's authorization.
The OpenChoreo API server (openchoreo-api) authorized requests to its exec and wirelogs endpoints against the project supplied by the caller in the request, rather than against the project that actually owns the target component. The target component was resolved by name only, and the authorization engine decided purely from the caller-supplied resource hierarchy — the component's real owning project was never checked. As a result, an authenticated user who holds …
OpenChoreo Workflow Plane templates were vulnerable to OS command injection because some developer-controlled workflow parameters were interpolated directly into shell program text executed through sh -c. An authenticated user with permission to configure and trigger an affected workflow could supply crafted parameter values containing shell metacharacters. Because Argo substituted these values directly into the shell script before execution, the values could alter the script and execute arbitrary commands inside the …
An authenticated user can upload a crafted agent bundle that defines a server-side Python callable tool. The server validates the uploaded bundle, but it does not block dangerous callable: paths in untrusted user-provided agent configs. When the tool is invoked, the runner imports and executes that Python callable. A crafted bundle can point the tool at subprocess.check_output, which lets the attacker run a local command on the runner machine. This …
An authenticated, non-admin user can obtain arbitrary host-filesystem read/write (and host environment-secret disclosure) on an Omnigent runner by uploading an agent bundle whose os_env.cwd points outside any intended workspace (e.g. / or /home/<victim>). The cwd field is taken verbatim from the bundle with no validation, normalization, or boundary check anywhere in the spec pipeline. This is a different sink from GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h (CWE-94, shared-agent bundle overwrite -> stdio MCP RCE). It …
An authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent. Shared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a stdio MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command.
The shared shell-command parser fails open. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn't recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns None, and None = abstain = ALLOW. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement — the product's two core safety guarantees.
nltk.parse.RecursiveDescentParser (and SteppingRecursiveDescentParser) enumerate parses top-down with no bound on the number of recursive steps. A small, crafted context-free grammar makes a short input consume unbounded CPU (and/or exhaust the Python recursion stack), pinning a process indefinitely — a denial of service.
nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader (used by FeatStruct(str) and by FeatureGrammar.fromstring()) parses feature-structure strings such as [a=1] with a recursive-descent parser that has no nesting-depth limit. A small, trivially-crafted input (~700 bytes) with deeply nested brackets drives the parser past Python's recursion limit and raises an unhandled RecursionError instead of the library's normal, catchable ValueError/LogicalExpressionException. Any application that parses user-supplied feature-structure or feature-grammar text (e.g. NLP teaching tools, grammar "playgrounds", unification-grammar-based NLU pipelines) can …
There is an SSRF vulnerability in NLTK 3.9.4's network URL validation. The validate_network_url() function in nltk/pathsec.py fails open when DNS resolution returns an error. The _resolve_hostname() helper at lines 193-234 catches OSError and ValueError during socket.getaddrinfo() and returns an empty list []. When this happens, the validation loop in validate_network_url() iterates over nothing (for addr in resolved: … never executes), with no else/fallback check. The function returns normally, and urlopen() …
nltk.stem.PorterStemmer.stem() – a ubiquitous public API applied to arbitrary, often untrusted, tokens – runs in O(n^2) time on a token containing a long run of the letter 'y', letting a single ~20-50 KB token pin a CPU core (CWE-407).
XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment() reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending each block to a growing fragment string, then calls _VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment) on the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the entire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input size. Commit c9c332284 (CWE-1333) made each match() call linear. The quadratic behavior is separate: the loop calls match() once per 1 KiB block, each time on …
Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.
NLTK's downloader now blocks symlink escapes during ZIP extraction, but it still treats pre-existing hardlinks inside the install tree as ordinary in-root files. A normal package install can therefore overwrite an outside-root inode through that hardlink.
NLTK's pathsec.py security module defaults to ENFORCE=False (line 24), which means all 8 security validation functions only emit RuntimeWarning instead of raising exceptions when violations are detected. The pathsec module was introduced as the fix for CVE-2024-39705 (arbitrary code execution via pickle) and CVE-2026-0846 (path traversal). However, with ENFORCE=False as the default: pathsec.open('/etc/passwd') succeeds (reads the file, emits warning) pathsec.validate_network_url('http://169.254.169.254/…') succeeds (warning only) pickle.loads() via nltk.data.load() proceeds despite unsafe source …
Mistune v3.3.2 is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack via uncontrolled recursion in the HTML rendering of deeply-nested emphasis tokens. By submitting Markdown containing approximately 1,000 consecutive asterisk characters, an attacker causes the Python process to crash with RecursionError.
Mailpit's thumbnail endpoint decodes attacker-supplied image attachments into a full raster before checking any decoded-pixel, dimension, or memory budget. A remote client that can store an email and reach the default web API can supply a compact high-dimension image, then request /api/v1/message/{id}/part/{partID}/thumb to force server-side memory and CPU work far larger than the encoded attachment size before Mailpit returns a 180x120 thumbnail.
Mailpit's SMTP server reads each command line with an unbounded bufio.Reader.ReadString('\n') before parsing the command or enforcing any protocol length limit. A remote SMTP client can send an oversized single command line and force Mailpit to allocate attacker-controlled memory before the server returns a syntax error or times out, even though RFC 5321 limits SMTP command lines to 512 octets including CRLF.
Mail::Utilities.q_value_decode and Mail::Utilities.b_value_decode decoded only the first RFC 2047 encoded-word in a string and used an overly greedy pattern to match the charset token. A crafted, malformed encoded-word embedded in an address display name or local part could cause the decoded output to differ from what a human reviewer or downstream parser would expect, allowing an attacker to spoof the apparent sender/recipient address.
In Livewire v3 (≤ 3.8.2) and v4 (≤ 4.3.3), a vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the origin of an affected application in specific scenarios. The issue stems from how certain client-side component state is handled. This vulnerability does not affect prior major versions. Exploitation requires user interaction, but does not require authentication or prior access to the application. The issue does not bypass server-side authorisation and …
The existing advisory GHSA-4gp8-rjrq-ch6q / CVE-2026-43897 states that the SSRF issue was fixed in 4.0.1. However, 4.0.3 remains bypassable when the documented resolveDNSHost mitigation is used. Root cause: The library validates one resolved IP address through resolveDNSHost, but later performs fetch() against the original hostname without pinning the connection to the validated IP. An attacker-controlled DNS server can return a public IP during validation and a loopback/internal IP during the …
In affected releases, the containment checks were incomplete and did not cover the case of a sibling directory next to the containment directory that starts with the same prefix. E.g. a directory site2 passed the containment check of directory site. This allowed attackers to access media files with prepared job files that are stored within such sibling directories of the site's index root, opening the potential for information leaks from …
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
A memory leak is possible when invalid options are passed to the cli (magick)
The Bug Hurl <= 8.0.1 lets you define cookies two ways in a .hurl file: As a raw Cookie: header in the [Header]/headers area In a dedicated [Cookies] section (parsed into RequestSpec.cookies) When following a redirect to a different host, Hurl correctly strips security-sensitive data (Authorization, Cookie header, and basic-auth user) to avoid leaking credentials cross-host — mirroring libcurl's default behavior. But it only stripped the cookie that came in …
@humanfs/node does not treat symlinks as a separate case during copy operations. A symlink placed inside an attacker-controlled source tree can make copyAll() read and copy the contents of any file readable by the process, even when that file is outside the directory being copied.
com.github.jknack.handlebars.springmvc.SpringTemplateLoader resolves Spring MVC view names into URLs via Spring's ResourceLoader without applying the path-containment check that protects every other URL-based loader in the project (ClassPathTemplateLoader, FileTemplateLoader, ServletContextTemplateLoader - all hardened by commit d177cdee). The only remaining defense for file: / classpath: view names is the unconditional .hbs suffix appended by AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve(…). This suffix is the load-bearing security boundary that prevents a request like view=file:/etc/passwd from reading /etc/passwd instead of …
The Twig content sandbox replaces config with the redacted SandboxConfig facade and strips Config::get/toArray from the method allowlist (GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9), so editor content can't read config secrets via config. That's bypassable: grav is the raw container, offsetget is allow-listed on it, so grav.offsetGet('config') returns the real Config. The allow-listed filters json_encode/print_r/yaml_encode then serialize it at the PHP level, never hitting the sandbox method gate, dumping the whole config tree including every …
An account with the admin.pages permission (or api.pages.write) can run shell commands on the server. The command executes whenever anyone — including an unauthenticated visitor — opens the page.
ZipArchiver::extract() lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth, creating a distinct, unpatched variant of the GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9 zip bomb vulnerability. While the parallel method Installer::unZip() received comprehensive limits, ZipArchiver::extract() remains unprotected, leaving a separate code path vulnerable to the same attack vector. The vulnerability is a distinct, unpatched variant of the bug described in GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9, as it affects a separate code path in the same codebase, implementing the …
The regex_replace filter and function are allowlisted in Grav's Twig content sandbox. When Twig processing in page content is enabled security.twig_content.process_enabled: true, authenticated page editors can supply a catastrophically backtracking PCRE pattern, causing unbounded CPU consumption and denying service to the entire web server process.
When 2FA is enabled on an account, submitting correct credentials authenticates the user but leaves them unauthorized pending TOTP verification. During this pending-challenge window, the login.regenerate2FASecret task which requires only $user->exists(), not $user->authorized can be called without a CSRF nonce. It overwrites the victim's twofa_secret on disk with an attacker-chosen value, returns the new secret in the JSON response, and the attacker computes a valid TOTP code to complete the …
The fix for CVE-2026-3635 (GHSA-444r-cwp2-x5xf) added a proxyFn(socket.remoteAddress, 0) guard on the X-Forwarded-* reads in request.host, request.protocol, request.hostname, request.ip, and request.ips. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of trustProxy correctly because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form (trustProxy: <number>) compiles to a predicate that structurally ignores the address argument, so the guard reduces to 0 < tp, always true for …
fastify before 5.12.1, when a route uses a root-level primitive body schema (for example an integer with a minimum and maximum) and the default type coercion, validates the coerced value but exposes the original, uncoerced value to the route handler. For example, a JSON body "10" is coerced to the number 10 and passes an integer 1 to 10 schema, but request.body stays the string "10". An application that trusts …
fast-uri decodes a hostname's percent escapes twice in a single normalize() or resolve() call: once during parsing and again during authority recomposition. A nested percent-encoded host therefore survives the first decode and is turned into a live destination by the second, so normalize('http://%256c%256f%2563%2561%256c%2568%256f%2573%2574/') returns http://localhost/. Applications that normalize or resolve an untrusted URI before an SSRF check, redirect validation, or host allowlist can be steered to a different destination, including …
fast-uri does not validate the complete RFC 3986 grammar for bracketed IPv6 literals, so a malformed literal with invalid trailing text is silently truncated to a different valid IPv6 address with no error reported. For example, normalize('http://[::not-valid]/private') returns http://[::]/private, and [fc00::not-hex] and [fe80::not-hex] collapse to [fc00::] and [fe80::]. An application that normalizes an untrusted URL before an outbound request, redirect, or host-policy check can be routed to a local or …
fast-uri canonicalizes a host to its ASCII form only when the input carries an explicit scheme. When resolve() resolves a scheme-relative reference (//host/) against a scheme-bearing base, it still emits the host verbatim even though the effective scheme is known, so re-parsing the resolved URI yields a different host than the one resolve() returned. An application that resolves an untrusted reference with fast-uri and then checks or routes on the …
fast-uri decodes percent-encoded characters in the scheme component with the legacy global unescape() and serializes the result back as raw characters, without re-escaping it or validating it as a scheme. A scheme that decodes to characters outside the RFC 3986 scheme grammar can therefore introduce structure the original input did not contain. For example, %2f%2fevil.example:/pwn parses with no authority (parse().host is undefined), but resolve() and normalize() return //evil.example:/pwn, which reparses …
faker.helpers.fake can be tricked into arbritary code execution.
elFinder provides uploadDeny and uploadAllow options in its connector configuration to restrict which MIME types may be uploaded. When uploadDeny includes text/x-php, direct upload of .php, .phtml, and .phar files is correctly blocked. However, the extract command (ZIP decompression) internally calls checkExtractItems(), which invokes mimetypeInternalDetect() directly without passing the result through mimeTypeNormalize(). Because phtml, phar, and similar PHP-executable extensions are absent from mime.types, they are not resolved to text/x-php at …
The PHP connector's CSRF gate protects many mutating commands, but it does not protect the netmount connector command. In the shipped minimal connector setup, FTP network mounting is enabled by default, so a cross-site request can force an elFinder instance to mount an attacker-chosen FTP endpoint in the victim's session and cause the server to initiate an outbound FTP connection without the X-elFinder-CSRF token that other state-changing commands require. This …
EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event. That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a …
@dicebear/core builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric rotate option is interpolated into an SVG transform attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup. This is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options backgroundColor, fontFamily, and textColor …
@dicebear/core builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric rotate option is interpolated into an SVG transform attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup. This is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options backgroundColor, fontFamily, and textColor …
The ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools restrict their server_url argument to dati.gov.it via a regular expression. The regex is anchored only at the start and places no boundary after the host, so any URL whose host merely begins with dati.gov.it — or that uses dati.gov.it as URL userinfo before an @ — passes validation while actually targeting an attacker-controlled host.
Full spoofing of any header value the backend trusts for authentication/authorization, for every proxy call type, for the lifetime of the connection – up to full account/identity impersonation depending on backend logic. No credentials, JWT, or API key required.
DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() interpolates the attacker-controllable Prompt.name into a Path expression with no canonicalization. An application that derives the prompt name from request data lets a caller write attacker-controlled bytes outside the configured registry directory.
The @apostrophecms/import-export module reconstructs the on-disk source path of every imported attachment from JSON metadata contained in the uploaded archive. The archive carries an aposAttachments.json file whose name and extension fields are concatenated into a filesystem path with no traversal check. The zip-slip guard that the module applies during tar extraction validates tar entry names only and does not cover this second path, which is built after extraction. The file …
The vulnerability is a single-request persistent DoS by submitting e.g. "PATCH /api/v1/article/" with a valid editor session and body of {"toString.call":"x"}, overwriting the global toString function with value x. Fabian
There is a lack of XSS escaping in the Spark History Server prior to 3.5.8 which allows a malicious Spark job to generate arbitrary unescaped frontend code which could lead to a minimal privilege escalation in browser. Users are encouraged to upgrade to Spark 3.5.8 or later. This CVE is marked as "low" since the path to exploit requires both relatively high permissions (ability to launch a Spark job) and …
There is a lack of XSS escaping in the Spark History Server prior to 3.5.8 which allows a malicious Spark job to generate arbitrary unescaped frontend code which could lead to a minimal privilege escalation in browser. Users are encouraged to upgrade to Spark 3.5.8 or later. This CVE is marked as "low" since the path to exploit requires both relatively high permissions (ability to launch a Spark job) and …
There is a lack of XSS escaping in the Spark History Server prior to 3.5.8 which allows a malicious Spark job to generate arbitrary unescaped frontend code which could lead to a minimal privilege escalation in browser. Users are encouraged to upgrade to Spark 3.5.8 or later. This CVE is marked as "low" since the path to exploit requires both relatively high permissions (ability to launch a Spark job) and …
Tornado parses application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies with urllib.parse.parse_qs and does not pass max_num_fields. A body made almost entirely of separators produces tens of millions of fields, and the parse happens on the event loop before the handler runs, so a single request stalls the whole server.
Problem The referrer enforcement introduced with TYPO3-CORE-SA-2020-006 (CVE-2020-11069) became ineffective in TYPO3 v13.0, where TYPO3 CMS started serving the backend and Admin Tool applications from the site's main entry script instead of the dedicated typo3/ directory. Whether a request originated from the backend or Install Tool itself was determined by comparing the referrer against the directory of the entry script, which since then is the site root. As a consequence, …
Problem The referrer enforcement introduced with TYPO3-CORE-SA-2020-006 (CVE-2020-11069) became ineffective in TYPO3 v13.0, where TYPO3 CMS started serving the backend and Admin Tool applications from the site's main entry script instead of the dedicated typo3/ directory. Whether a request originated from the backend or Install Tool itself was determined by comparing the referrer against the directory of the entry script, which since then is the site root. As a consequence, …
parse_multipart_form_data (httputil.py:34) calls data.split(b"–"+boundary+b"\r\n") before the max_parts check (:35). A 600KB body with 100k parts creates a 100k-element transient list first, then rejects transient memory amplification (each split element is a copy). Pre-auth HTTP DoS.
The CVE-2026-35536 fix added a validation loop that rejects [\x00-\x20\x3b\x7f], but only for the hardcoded lowercase keys name/domain/path/samesite. The still-live deprecated **kwargs path writes attacker-supplied attribute values straight into the Morsel with no validation, and because Morsel.setitem is case-insensitive, a capitalized kwarg (Domain=, Path=, SameSite=, Max-Age=) routes to the same reserved attribute while bypassing the loop — re-opening ;-delimited attribute injection. self.set_cookie("sid", "abc", Domain="evil.com; Secure; SameSite=None")
When SQL is formatted with reindentation enabled, ReindentFilter repeatedly rebuilds prefixes of the current statement to calculate token offsets. An attacker who controls SQL sent to this opt-in formatting path can supply a parenthesized tuple list that remains just below the grouping-token cap. Thousands of offset calculations then traverse an expanding token tree, causing multi-second CPU consumption from an input of roughly 16 KB and degrading service availability.
When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.
An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes and large memory consumption. This requires accessing the outlines of a document with either lots of entries or nested outlines with long re-used nesting paths.
An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes and large memory consumption. This requires extracting the text of a page with lots of XForm objects, where some of them might be re-used.
An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires a (usually writing) code path where TreeObject.insert_child is involved.
A crafted lockfile alias could reach several install-time filesystem joins. With –trust-lockfile or a frozen lockfile, traversal segments could create links outside the intended project or node_modules boundary. This patch validates dependency names and every virtual-store slot before creating directories, links, bins, or hoisted entries.
pnpm expands ${VAR} environment placeholders in the httpProxy / httpsProxy / noProxy settings read from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs pnpm install in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as NPM_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN. This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm …
Two NLTK sites executed the Graphviz dot program by bare name, so process creation resolved it via the search path — and on Windows via the current working directory — rather than a validated absolute location. An attacker who can place a file named dot where resolution looks (the CWD on Windows, or a writable/relative entry such as . on PATH) has their binary executed in place of Graphviz (arbitrary …
An attacker who controls the java_options parameter to any NLTK Stanford wrapper class can inject arbitrary JVM flags, including: -agentpath:/path/to/malicious.so – loads a native agent, achieving arbitrary code execution -javaagent:/path/to/malicious.jar – loads a Java agent for bytecode manipulation -agentlib:jdwp=transport=dt_socket,server=y,address=*:5005 – enables remote debugging, allowing remote code execution @/path/to/argfile – expands an argument file, which can smuggle any of the above This is exploitable in scenarios where NLTK is deployed as …
An integer overflow in nanoid(size) permanently corrupts the process-wide CSPRNG pool, causing all subsequent ID generation to return the deterministic string "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu". Any application that passes user-influenced values to the size parameter loses all randomness guarantees for session tokens, CSRF tokens, and unique identifiers until process restart.
A rogue MySQL server (or MITM) can force mysql2 to send credentials in plaintext by requesting an auth switch to mysql_clear_password. The driver complies without verifying that TLS is active.
MLflow introduced MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION as a security control to prevent unsafe pickle.load execution during model loading, in response to CVE-2024-37052 through CVE-2024-37060. When set to False, operators expect all pickle deserialization to be blocked. The most recent related fix (#21188) patched a bypass in the pyfunc flavor. However, the mlflow.statsmodels flavor completely omits this guard. An attacker who places a crafted MLmodel artifact into any accessible artifact store can trigger arbitrary …
AttributesExtension ships with the library but must be explicitly registered on the Environment; it is not included in CommonMarkConverter, GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter, or GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension. Applications that do not register AttributesExtension are not affected by this advisory. Two paths in the extension re-process every attribute a node has already collected each time another attribute is applied to it. When the attributes carry distinct names, the collected set grows by one on every step …
Affected versions of league/commonmark perform super-linear work on three independent parsing paths, all of which are reachable on a stock new CommonMarkConverter() with default configuration and no extensions registered. Each trigger fits on a single line of input, so no complex Markdown structure is required. The three paths were introduced at different times. This advisory's version range is their union; the individual ranges are: | Path | Affected from | …
Two first-party extensions contain quadratic parsing paths. Both ship with the library but must be explicitly registered on the Environment; neither is included in CommonMarkConverter, GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter, or GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension. Applications that do not register SmartPunctExtension or AttributesExtension are not affected by this advisory. 1. SmartPunctExtension — quote replacement recopies the whole text node (affected from 2.0.0). ReplaceUnpairedQuotesListener converts each unpaired Quote node back to a Text node and merges it into …
The AttributesExtension documents a security guarantee: Note: Attributes starting with on (e.g. onclick or onerror) are capable of executing JavaScript code and are therefore never allowed by default. You must explicitly add them to the allow list if you want to use them. — docs/2.x/extensions/attributes.md Prefixing the attribute name with a single U+000C FORM FEED byte defeats that guarantee. {<FF>onclick="alert(1)"} passes through AttributesHelper::filterAttributes() untouched and is written verbatim into the …
Some internal errors may contain sensitive information in the error message itself. This is often the case with PHP errors. In affected releases, the REST API error handler did not sanitize error messages for sensitive information. This exposed system information like the full source path to external API users, including users without authentication. This could be used to guess the default content.salt or prepare specialized attacks.
A flaw was found in Jolokia's JSR-160 proxy functionality where insufficient validation of client-controlled JMX service URLs allows a bypass of the denylist introduced to mitigate CVE-2018-1000130. The proxy accepts a target.url value from a Jolokia POST request and passes it to JMXServiceURL and JMXConnectorFactory for establishing the remote JMX connection. The existing denylist only rejects URLs matching service:jmx:rmi:///jndi/ldap:.*, which can be bypassed using alternative valid JMX service URL forms, …
A vulnerability in Hugging Face Transformers (versions 4.49.0, <= 5.8.1) allows remote Python files to be written to local disk without user consent when using GenerativePreTrainedModel.load_custom_generate(). The function fetches and caches a remote module file before performing the required trust_remote_code consent check, inverting the security model enforced by other code-loading paths (such as AutoConfig, AutoModel, and AutoTokenizer). As a result, attacker‑controlled Python code from custom_generate/generate.py is copied into the user’s …
An unauthenticated remote attacker can initiate a gRPC stream and purposefully fragment their payload into millions of tiny (e.g., 1-byte) HTTP/2 DATA frames. Even if the total payload volume falls within the configured connection and stream flow-control windows, each independent fragment incurs memory overhead due to internal tracking structures and queue allocation. Repeated fragmentation massively inflates the heap space consumed by the stream. An attacker multiplexing multiple concurrent streams can …
When multi-factor authentication is enabled, the login page presents the multi-factor challenge before evaluating canAccessPanel(). For an account that canAccessPanel() denies, submitting the correct password renders the challenge while an incorrect password returns the generic failure message, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to confirm that a password is valid for that account. When email-based multi-factor authentication is used, a login code is also sent to the account holder. This issue only …
A flaw in the handling of one-time codes for app-based multi-factor authentication allows a previously issued code to be used after a newer code has already been accepted. This issue does not affect email-based MFA. Submitting the exact same code twice was already prevented, but any other code within the accepted time window was not. If an attacker gains access to both the user's password and a single one-time code, …
A flaw in the challenge handling for app-based multi-factor authentication allows the second factor to be bypassed. This issue does not affect email-based MFA. It also only applies when recovery codes are enabled.
While investigating Django REST Framework's request parsing behavior, I identified that DRF's high-level request.data parsing appears to bypass Django's configured DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE protection for application/json and application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies. In the tested configurations, Django correctly raises RequestDataTooBig when applications access request.body or Django's native request.POST, but DRF successfully parses the same oversized payloads through request.data. This behavior appears to occur because DRF passes the underlying HttpRequest object directly to parsers, which …
Summary AdminRenderer may disclose data that would normally be protected by GET permissions when rendering a 400 Bad Request response for an invalid write request. If a view allows POST (or another write method) but denies GET, an invalid request rendered through AdminRenderer can invoke the view's GET handler and include data from the GET representation in the generated HTML response. This behavior appears to be specific to AdminRenderer and …
Who is affected: Any project whose build/CI invokes Browserslist (directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency), or any app that passes user-influenced data into opts.stats. What an attacker achieves: Immediate DoS — crashes the invoking process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any query, no special syntax needed. Conditions required: No authentication — …
Who is affected: Long-running processes calling browserslist() with query values that vary across requests/items and are influenced by external input. What an attacker achieves: DoS via eventual out-of-memory crash, given sustained traffic over time (not a single small payload). Conditions required: No authentication; requires volume rather than a single request, hence Medium rather than High severity.
Appium's base-driver mounts the built-in /test/guinea-pig, /test/guinea-pig-scrollable and /test/guinea-pig-app-banner routes unconditionally on every server. The handler reflects the throwError query param, the comments POST field, and the User-Agent request header into the returned HTML via compileLodashTemplate, which interpolates <%= expr %> as String(expr) with no HTML/JS escaping. This yields reflected XSS, and the throwError value is reflected inside a <script> block, giving arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server's origin. No …
When SVG animation is allowed, attributeName="href" makes values a list of URL destinations. sanitize-html accepts a list that starts with a safe fragment even when values is explicitly scheme-checked, allowing a later javascript: destination to execute when the sanitized link is activated.