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Whistle vulnerable to path traversal

This bug was found by nova, which is an automated tool from group of Song Wu, intern, Zhejiang University; BoWang, independent researcher; Xingwei Lin, Zhejiang University. Vulnerability detail: In service.js, inside app.get('/cgi-bin/temp/get', …): var filename = req.query.filename; if (TEMP_FILE_RE.test(filename)) { filename = path.join(TEMP_FILES_PATH, filename); } getFile(filename, …); Only when filename matches the temp/ pattern does it get joined to the safe directory TEMP_FILES_PATH. If it does not match that pattern, …

utcp-http SSRF: HTTP tool invocation follows redirects without re-validating the target

HttpCommunicationProtocol.call_tool validates only the pre-redirect tool URL, then issues the request with redirects enabled and never re-checks where it lands. A tool whose endpoint is an attacker-controlled public URL can therefore 302-redirect the UTCP client into an internal service including the cloud metadata endpoint and the response body is returned to the tool caller. This is a working SSRF + internal-data-exfiltration primitive. This is the redirect invariant of the SSRF …

utcp-http has an OAuth2 `tokenUrl` Trust Boundary Bypass in OpenAPI Conversion

The utcp-http library (<= 1.1.3) unconditionally trusts the tokenUrl field embedded in remote OpenAPI security schemes. When a victim registers an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec and invokes any generated OAuth2-protected tool, the library POSTs the victim's client_id and client_secret to the attacker-supplied token endpoint without any URL validation. The same ensure_secure_url() guard applied to discovery URLs and tool invocation URLs is absent for the OAuth2 token endpoint, creating a credential-exfiltration path.

utcp-gql SSRF: CVE-2026-44661 fix not applied to the GraphQL and WebSocket plugins

The fix for CVE-2026-44661 (commit 5b16e43) added the ensure_secure_url() / is_secure_url() helpers and wired them into the three HTTP-family plugins, but it did not reach the GraphQL or WebSocket plugins. The GraphQL plugin (utcp-gql) still uses the startswith prefix check that the fix explicitly replaced, so http://127.0.0.1.attacker.example and http://localhost.evil.com pass it. The WebSocket plugin (utcp-websocket) performs no URL validation at all, even though its own docstrings state it enforces "WSS …

utcp-gql SSRF: CVE-2026-44661 fix not applied to the GraphQL and WebSocket plugins

The fix for CVE-2026-44661 (commit 5b16e43) added the ensure_secure_url() / is_secure_url() helpers and wired them into the three HTTP-family plugins, but it did not reach the GraphQL or WebSocket plugins. The GraphQL plugin (utcp-gql) still uses the startswith prefix check that the fix explicitly replaced, so http://127.0.0.1.attacker.example and http://localhost.evil.com pass it. The WebSocket plugin (utcp-websocket) performs no URL validation at all, even though its own docstrings state it enforces "WSS …

urllib's cross-origin redirects preserve credential-bearing request headers, leading to potential credential leakage

urllib supports redirect-following through followRedirect, which is expected behavior for an HTTP client. The issue is that, when following a redirect to a different origin, urllib preserves the caller-supplied request headers verbatim, including credential-bearing headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and custom auth headers (x-api-key, x-auth-token, x-access-token). If the redirect target is attacker-controlled or outside the trust boundary of the original target, credentials intended for the original origin can be …

Trivy has a path traversal via a crafted vulnerability database or other downloaded artifacts

When Trivy downloads an OCI artifact, it uses the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from the artifact manifest as the destination filename without validation. An attacker who can make Trivy fetch an attacker-controlled artifact can supply a crafted annotation that resolves to a path outside the intended destination, causing Trivy to write the layer content to an arbitrary location on the host filesystem.

Recently updated

Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.