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XWiki Platform Live Data Live Table Connector has privilege escalation from edit to script right through Live Data editing

Any user who can edit a page in XWiki can use Live Data's edit REST API in XWiki to change the rights on that page. This allows the user to obtain script right on the page. Script right allows the user to execute potentially dangerous Velocity scripts and send unfiltered HTML and JavaScript to the client. If there are other security checks, e.g., in extensions, implemented as listeners to UserUpdatingDocumentEvent …

Uprobe gadgets: unprivileged container's ld.so.cache causes high CPU utilization and container startup DoS

An unprivileged container can block all other containers from starting on the same host by placing a crafted /etc/ld.so.cache file in its filesystem. When Inspektor Gadget attaches any uprobe-based gadget, it parses this file in the container startup path. A malicious cache causes ~53 seconds of CPU burn, during which Docker cannot start any other container. No special capabilities are required.

Tina: Cross-origin `POST /media/upload/*` requests can write arbitrary files into the Tina dev server media root

A browser-based cross-origin request flaw in the Tina dev server allows an attacker-controlled website to cause arbitrary file creation inside the configured media upload directory on a developer machine running tinacms dev. No manual file upload is required. The attacker page builds the multipart request in JavaScript and sends it directly to the local Tina server. The browser blocks access to the response because of CORS, but the server still …

Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)

The production media handler shipped by next-tinacms-s3 (createMediaHandler in packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts) accepts an attacker-chosen ?key= query parameter and returns an AWS-signed PutObject URL whose Key is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured mediaRoot. The same handler's DELETE branch reads objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1] and dispatches a DeleteObjectCommand for that exact key, again unbounded by mediaRoot. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied authorized() predicate …

Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)

The production media handler shipped by next-tinacms-s3 (createMediaHandler in packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts) accepts an attacker-chosen ?key= query parameter and returns an AWS-signed PutObject URL whose Key is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured mediaRoot. The same handler's DELETE branch reads objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1] and dispatches a DeleteObjectCommand for that exact key, again unbounded by mediaRoot. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied authorized() predicate …

Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)

The production media handler shipped by next-tinacms-s3 (createMediaHandler in packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts) accepts an attacker-chosen ?key= query parameter and returns an AWS-signed PutObject URL whose Key is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured mediaRoot. The same handler's DELETE branch reads objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1] and dispatches a DeleteObjectCommand for that exact key, again unbounded by mediaRoot. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied authorized() predicate …

Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)

The production media handler shipped by next-tinacms-s3 (createMediaHandler in packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts) accepts an attacker-chosen ?key= query parameter and returns an AWS-signed PutObject URL whose Key is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured mediaRoot. The same handler's DELETE branch reads objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1] and dispatches a DeleteObjectCommand for that exact key, again unbounded by mediaRoot. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied authorized() predicate …

Snipe-IT: Stored DOM XSS via table selected-count IDs

The table component derives data-selected-count-id from the component $name value. On manufacturer and supplier detail pages, stored manufacturer or supplier names are passed into affected table components as that name value. The client-side JavaScript later reads the browser-decoded data-selected-count-id, uses it as a selector, and concatenates countId.substring(1) directly into an HTML string passed to jQuery .after(). Affected commit: b224cc636c6780386e3f73f03d1171f52ab4c37a Example payload for a manufacturer or supplier name: x[foo="><svg/onload=alert(1)>"]> The issue …

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Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.