Recently added

russh: Unbounded memory allocation in agent protocol server via crafted constraint records

russh_keys::agent::server::add_key (russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:271-319) spawns a dedicated tokio task for every 5-byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME record attached to an added key, each cloning the key blob and sleeping for the declared lifetime (up to ~136 years). The loop has no per-request task budget, and spawned tasks are not rolled back when the overall request fails. Repeating one constrained add-key message over an agent connection converts wire bytes into resident tasks and heap at roughly …

Mercury: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via /api/kernels

Mercury runs a JupyterLab server with anonymous access by default (mercury_app/main.py sets –IdentityProvider.token='' when no –token/MERCURY_TOKEN is given; when tokenless it also sets –ServerApp.disable_check_xsrf=True). It relies on a blocklist (mercury_app/block_handler.py BLOCKED_PATTERNS: /lab, /api/terminals, /api/shutdown, /files) to keep anonymous users off dangerous Jupyter endpoints.

Mercury: Stored / DOM Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): mr.Markdown renders untrusted content as raw, unsanitized HTML

Mercury turns Jupyter notebooks into shared web apps/dashboards. The mr.Markdown widget converts its input to HTML with python-markdown and no sanitization step. MarkdownWidget is an ipywidgets.HTML widget, whose value is written to the page as raw HTML (via innerHTML) with no sanitization, so the result reaches the DOM verbatim. When an app passes untrusted data (database rows, user submissions, uploaded file contents, or an external/LLM API response) to mr.Markdown, HTML/JS …

LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files

loopx serve-status sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response, including its unauthenticated GET routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo, using a plain fetch() with no user interaction. The write endpoints are not affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly …

Graphify Fortran extractor: incomplete cpp #include hardening allows arbitrary host-file read/exfiltration when indexing an untrusted repo

The Fortran extractor's C-preprocessor step (graphify/extractors/fortran.py, _cpp_preprocess) applies an incomplete #include hardening. The -nostdinc -I /dev/null flags it relies on (comment "Security (F-007)") do not stop a capital-F Fortran source file from including absolute paths (#include "/etc/passwd") or from path-traversing out of the corpus (#include "../../../../home/victim/.ssh/id_rsa"). cpp always searches the directory of the file being preprocessed for quoted includes and always honours absolute include paths, regardless of -nostdinc/-I. As a …

Recently updated

Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.